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THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED: CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT OUTSIDE ARTICLE V
Akhil Reed Amar*
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are cre-
ated equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights.... That... Governments... deriv[e] their
just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever
any Form of Government becomes destructive of [its] ends, it is
the right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new
Government, laying its foundations on such principles and or-
ganizing its Powers in such form, as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.1
Ringing words-but words that ring hollow today. Mark Twain once
defined a literary "classic" as a work "which people praise and don't
read."2 Jefferson's majestic proclamation of self-evident truths has
reached an even more exalted status: words which people praise and do
read, but don't understand. For if understood, these words, and their
evolving meaning between 1776 and 1789, call for a fundamental rethink-
ing of conventional understandings of the U.S. Constitution. Concretely,
the U.S. Constitution is a far more majoritarian and populist document
than we have generally thought; and We the People of the United States
have a legal right to alter our Government-to change our Constitu-
tion-via a majoritarian and populist mechanism akin to a national refer-
endum, even though that mechanism is not explicitly specified in Article
V.
Or so I have argued elsewhere. I first presented my musings on the
topic in the shadow ofJefferson's beloved Monticello, at the University of
Virginia that he founded. My conclusion troubled me-I suspected my
audience might well wonder if someone had been messing with the
drinking water in New Haven-so I invited my audience to show me
where I had gone wrong. Many posed thoughtful questions, but none
that went to the heart of the thing. When I sketched my preliminary
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analysis in print-in the Fall 1988 University of Chicago Law Review-I be-
gan by acknowledging that my conclusions "may at first seem fanciful"
and that I would probably need more than the "brief space" of that article
to persuade the legal community "beyond all doubt."3 Near the end, I
noted that my analysis of Article V "may well scare [the reader.] To be
honest, it scares me a little too."4 Once again, I welcomed and waited for
refutation. In the years since then, I have read more widely on the topic
and had countless conversations with students, colleagues, and critics.
And today, I must say, I am more confident about my Article V conjecture
than I was in 1988. Of course it remains quite possible that I have simply
not done my sums straight. And so I now propose to revisit and revise the
basic "proof' of my "conjecture"-with apologies to Fermat, let's call it
my "First Theorem"-and to ask once again: what's wrong with this
picture?
In Part I of what follows, I describe two plausible interpretations of
Article V. The conventional reading of Article V sees it as the exclusive
mechanism of lawful constitutional amendment, whereas a popular sover-
eignty reading insists that Article V establishes only the exclusive mecha-
nism of lawful amendment by ordinary Government officials (Congress and
state legislatures). To adjudicate between these two plausible interpreta-
tions, we must examine the rest of the Constitution. That examination
occurs in Part II. I argue that unlike Jefferson's Declaration of 1776, the
Constitution was lawful, not revolutionary. Between the Revolution and
the Constitution, popular sovereignty principles in America evolved be-
yond the Lockean core of the Declaration and established the legal right
of the polity to alter or abolish their government at any time and for any
reason, by a peaceful and simple majoritarian process. Although various
pre-1787 state constitutions featured clauses analogous to Article V that at
first seemed to specify the exclusive mode of lawful constitutional change,
these Article V analogues were not in fact exclusive; a popular majority
retained a legal right to alter or abolish outside these Article V analogues.
I argue that Article V itself is likewise nonexclusive, and that majoritarian
popular sovereignty principles are clearly a part of the U.S. Constitution
in both word and deed, whether one focuses on the very act of ordain-
ment and establishment or on the texts of the Preamble and the First,
Ninth, and Tenth Amendments. In Part III, I acknowledge and try to
refute important objections to this claim.
I. WHAT ARTICLE V DOES NOT SAY AND CANNOT Do
My proposition is that We the People of the United States-more
specifically, a majority of voters-retain an unenumerated, constitutional
right to alter our Government and revise our Constitution in a way not
3. Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside
Article V, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1043, 1044 (1988).
4. Id. at 1096.
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explicitly set out in Article V. Specifically, I believe that Congress would
be obliged to call a convention to propose revisions if a majority of
American voters so petition; and that an amendment or new Constitution
could be lawfully ratified by a simple majority of the American electorate.
Let us first consider the words of Article V:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or,
on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the sev-
eral States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments,
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes,
as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of
three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification
may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amend-
ment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight
hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and
fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that
no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suf-
frage in the Senate.5
Begin by noting what Article V does not say. It emphatically does not
say that it is the only way to revise the Constitution. Of course, we often
read the enumeration of one mode (or in this case four modes, if we
multiply the two Article V mechanisms for proposing amendments by the
two Article V mechanisms for ratifying them) as impliedly precluding any
other modes. Congress cannot generally exercise powers other than
those enumerated in Article I, section 8; or generally pass laws other than
via bicameralism and presentment; and so on. But there is an alternative
way of understanding the implied exclusivity of Article V: it enumerates
the only mode(s) by which ordinary Government-Congress and state leg-
islatures-can change the Constitution, and thereby free themselves from
various limits on their power imposed by the Constitution itself. (With-
out Article V, Government would have no such power.) 6 Under this alter-
native view, Article V nowhere prevents the People themselves, acting apart
from ordinary Government, from exercising their legal right to alter or
abolish Government via the proper legal procedures. Article V presup-
poses this background legal right of the people, and does nothing to in-
terfere with it. It merely specifies how ordinary Government can amend
the Constitution without recurring to the People themselves, the true and
sovereign source of all lawful power.
This alternative reading taps into Jefferson's self-evident truths.7
Jefferson sharply distinguishes between Government and the People, and
so does this alternative reading. Jefferson explicitly speaks of the right of
5. U.S. Const. art. V.
6. See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, at 273,
276, 277, 290, 306, 337 (1969).
7. It also in some respects goes beyond the core meaning of Jefferson's words as
understood in 1776. See infra text accompanying notes 17-19, 62-65.
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"the People" to re-Constitute their Government and so do various provi-
sions of the U.S. Constitution-the Preamble and the First, Ninth, and
Tenth Amendments-that support the alternative reading of Article V.
(We shall return to these provisions later.)
The conventional view of Article V sees it as implementing Jefferson's
formulation rather than supplementing it. But this makes hash of
Jefferson's language and logic. First, Article V is Government-driven: if
exclusive, it gives ordinary Government officials-Congress and state leg-
islatures-a monopoly on initiating the process of constitutional change.
By contrast, Jefferson's self-evident truth, and the popular sovereignty
ideology that emerged from the American Revolution, are People-driven.
Popular sovereignty cannot be satisfied by a Government monopoly on
amendment, for the Government might simply block any constitutional
change that limits Government's power, even if strongly desired by the
People. (Elections for Government officials do not solve this problem; in
the 1780s, not all members of the polity were even eligible to vote for, say,
state senators-who in turn helped elect U.S. Senators; but all members
of the polity-"freemen," in 1787-were by definition part of "the Peo-
ple" eligible to participate in People-driven constitutional change.)8 Sec-
ond, and related, Article V is minoritarian. Precisely because ordinary
Government is distrusted, it may not amend the Constitution without
amassing an extraordinary bloc of Government officials.9 A mere minor-
ity of officials may often stymie constitutional change. But, as we shall see
below, Jefferson's self-evident truth and the spirit of popular sovereignty
it unleashed were universally understood in 1787 as majoritarian. A sim-
ple majority of the People themselves-members of the polity-had a
legal right to alter Government and change Constitutions. If exclusive,
Article V betrays this right, for it is child's play to conjure up cases where
the obstacle course of Article V would block the amendment path, even if
a bona fide majority of American voters enthusiastically supported
amendment.
It appears, then, that there are two plausible interpretations of the
implied exclusivity of Article V: (1) the conventional reading that it enu-
8. For discussions of the special franchise rules in effect when "the People" ratified
constitutions, see Samuel B. Harding, Party Struggles Over the First Pennsylvania
Constitution, Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1894, at
371, 371-75 (1895); Wood, supra note 6, at 289; James G. Pope, Republican Moments:
The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Constitutional Order, 139 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 287, 338 & n.235 (1990). For a similar analysis of Reconstruction era conventions, see
Michael Les Benedict, A Compromise of Principle 108 (1974). To take a more modern
example: even if today's electorate strongly desires legislative term limits, ordinary
legislators may simply block any constitutional amendment to that effect. And the
electoral check against this kind of self-dealing is quite weak; any district whose voters
punish the incumbent by throwing the rascal out will lose legislative seniority and clout vis-
i-vis other districts, in a kind of prisoners' dilemma. See Akhil Reed Amar & Vik Amar,
President Quayle?, 78 Va. L. Rev. 913, 928-29 (1992).
9. See 2 The Works of James Wilson 509 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967); Amar,
supra note 3, at 1093-94 & n.180.
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merates the only mode(s) by which the Constitution may be amended,
and (2) an alternative reading that it enumerates the only mode(s) by
which ordinary Government may amend the Constitution. How shall we
decide which is the better reading? By widening our focus beyond the
narrow text of Article V to consider other parts of the original
Constitution, various glossing provisions of the federal Bill of Rights, and
various Article V analogues in state constitutions.
Widening our frame will also help cure an underlying anxiety that, I
think, may wrongly tilt lawyers towards the conventional reading of
Article V exclusivity. The Constitution is supreme law, and the legal rules
it establishes for its own amendment are of unsurpassed importance, for
these rules define the conditions under which all other constitutional
norms may be legally displaced. It is comforting to believe that Article V
lays down these all-important legal rules with precision. If we stick close
to Article V, we are safe: if we go beyond it, we are at sea.
But this picture is an optical illusion. Article V is far less precise than
we might expect. What voting rule must an Article V proposing conven-
tion follow? What apportionment ratio? Can an amendment modify the
rules of amendment themselves? If so, couldn't the "equal suffrage" rules
of Article V be easily evaded by two successive "ordinary" amendments,
the first of which repealed the equal suffrage rules themselves, and the
second of which reapportioned the Senate? Could a legitimate amend-
ment generally purport to make itself (or any other random provision of
the Constitution) immune from further amendment? If so, wouldn't that
clearly violate the legal right of future generations to alter their Govern-
ment? Wouldn't the same be true of an amendment that effectively en-
trenched itself from further revision by, say, outlawing criticism of
existing law? But if that would be unconstitutional, haven't we in effect
made the narrow and hard core of our First Amendment itself
unamendable?
If determinate answers to these and other questions exist, they lie
outside Article V, narrowly construed-in other provisions of the
Constitution, in the overall structure and popular sovereignty spirit of the
document, in the history of its creation and amendment, and in the his-
tory of the creation and amendment of analogous legal documents, such
as state constitutions. And once we consult these sources, we will find
that we are in fact not at sea.10 The very sources that render Article V
rules determinate also clarify the equally determinate rules for People-
driven, majoritarian constitutional change outside Article V. By 1787, at
least, the legal rules underlying Jefferson's right of the People to alter or
abolish were no murkier or more mysterious than those encoded in Arti-
cle V.
10. For a brief discussion of how these intra-Article V questions should be resolved in
light of the theory and evidence presented here, see infra note 154.
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II. WHA THE REST OF THE CONSTITUTION DoES SAY AND Do
In considering the "Constitution" as a whole, we must remember that
it is not simply a text, but an act: the found-ing and constitut-ing-in the
Preamble's phrase, the "ordain [ing]" and "establish [ing] "-of a new na-
tion and a new regime of governance. And more: this act of founding, of
constitution, was-and was universally understood to be in 1787-itself
an act of "the People" exercising and implementing their "self-evident"
right to "alter or abolish" existing Government "and to institute new Gov-
ernment, laying its foundations on such principles and organizing its
Powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their
Safety and Happiness." If you have any doubtsjust listen to the Preamble
with fresh ears, and hear how it self-consciously echoes and paraphrases
Jefferson's self-evident Declaration:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more per-
fect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, pro-
vide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare,
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Poster-
ity [i.e., in order to "effect" our "Safety and Happiness"], do or-
dain and establish [i.e., "institute"] this ["new"] Constitution for
the United States of America.1'
We shall ponder this text more carefully later. But for now, let's fo-
cus on the act of constitution itself. What does the act say and do-for it
does by saying and says by doing-about the legal right of We the People
to alter or abolish what We have legally ordained and established?
A. The Legality of the Constitution
One camp of modern scholars might quickly answer, "nothing at all."
Some scholars claim that the Constitution of 1787 was itself illegal. 12 If
indeed the Constitution "was itself the product of blatant and conscious
illegality,"13 perhaps it tells us nothing about the People's legal right to
11. U.S. Const. pmbl. (emphasis added).
12. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storm Lectures: Discovering the Constitution,
93 Yale L.J. 1013, 1058 (1984) (declaring that ratification of Constitution was, under pre-
existing law, "plainly illegal"); Richard S. Kay, The Illegality of the Constitution, 4 Const.
Commentaries 57, 70 (1987) ("[T]he entire ratification process was undertaken without
legal sanction and, in significant part, in contradiction to law.").
13. Kay, supra note 12, at 57. In his recent book, Professor Ackerman writes that he
finds "Profesor [sic] Kay's arguments establishing the illegality of the Constitution more
persuasive than ProfessorAmar's [attempted refutation.]" Bruce Ackerman, We the People
328 n.4 (1991). This statement is puzzling given that Professor Kay nowhere even shows
his awareness of-much less refutes-the Federalists' compelling rejoinder to the claim of
illegality made by the Constitution's opponents. See infra text accompanying notes 20-36
(discussing "breached treaty" rejoinder).
It is also odd that both Ackerman and Kay ignore the strongest and most interesting
claim of illegality, which focuses not on the Articles of Confederation, but on the pre-
existing state constitutions. See infra text accompanying notes 37-39.
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alter or abolish.' 4 Under this "illegal" argument, the Constitution was a
second American revolution, different only from the first and its 1776
Declaration in that the second was bloodless.
1. Legality and the Declaration. - While I applaud any effort to place
the Constitution and Declaration side by side, this "illegal" argument
misses important differences between the two documents-and indeed
between the meaning ofJefferson's words in 1776 and their meaning in
1787. When written in 1776, Jefferson's words in large part appealed to a
Lockean right of violent revolution, triggered when Government had
breached its pact with the citizenry by violating fundamental rights. 15
This Lockean right required no vote of the People themselves. And if a
legal vote were to be taken in 1776, it was far from clear that the voters
should include only Englishmen in America but not Englishmen in
Britain, since it was doubtful that prior to 1776 Americans and Britons
were in law distinct sovereign peoples. (Jefferson thought they were dis-
tinct and said so in early drafts of the Declaration, but the Continental
Congress edited these passages out.16 If Americans were indeed distinct
from the time of their crossing the ocean, by what right had Parliament
ever legislated for them?) Precisely because the right of revolution re-
quired force-bullets, not ballots-it could be invoked only if a convinc-
ing case could be made of Government oppression. Thus the main
purpose of the Declaration was to make this Lockean/revolutionary case
by submitting "Facts . . . to a candid world," piling up example upon
example of one act of oppression after another, amounting to "a long
train of abuses and usurpations" evincing a "design to reduce [Americans]
under absolute Despotism." 17
But once the Revolution succeeded, Americans re-Constituted their
colonial governments on purely democratic rather than monarchical
foundations. As we shall soon see, over the next decade the previously
revolutionary right to alter and abolish became domesticated and legalized
in each of the thirteen former colonies. Ballots would replace bullets,
and the People could exercise this right not simply (as Jefferson's initial
phrase could be read to imply) "whenever any Form of Government be-
comes destructive of [its] ends" by violating unalienable rights, but at any
time and for any reason that the People (by majority vote) deemed suffi-
14. Professor Ackerman, who insists that the Constitution was "plainly illegal" yet
furnishes a sturdy precedent for future legal amendments, openly flirts with paradox, if not
contradiction. If James Madison's and James Wilson's Constitution violated pre-existing
legal rules, how was it any different from Jefferson Davis's Confederate Constitution,
except that Madison and Wilson succeeded, ex post, and Davis did not? Ackerman's "laws"
of amendment seem more laws of political science-empirical regularities, like the "laws"
of supply and demand-than formal, legal, procedural laws that specify an ex ante rule of
recognition.
15. See John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government §§ 221, 243 (C.B.
Macpherson ed., 1980).
16. See Gary Wills, Inventing America 76-90 (1978).
17. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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cient. By 1787, the accent had shifted to Jefferson's more expansive
clause stressing the People's power to institute new Governments as "to
them-not anyone else, not a king, not the world-"shall seem most
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."' 8
This evolution and legalization was a truly transcendent American
achievement, played out on the high political stage of each of the thir-
teen states in the thirteen fateful years between 1776 and 1789. For as we
shall soon see in greater detail, individual states echoed the Declaration
of 1776 and extended it, giving the people's right to alter or abolish a
precise, regular, peaceful, and legal form that it lacked before 1776. Sov-
ereignty was not merely derived from the People-to be momentarily re-
claimed by them only in awful spasms of revolutionary violence-but
inalienably vested in and retained by the People, and could be exercised
peacefully by simple majorities at the polls and in special popular assem-
blies/conventions. By 1787, the transition was complete. The Constitu-
tion needed no long train of abuses by state governments to justify itself,
and recited none. In contrast to the Declaration, it submitted itself to a
peaceful popular vote in each state, under principles of majority rule.
Unlike American Loyalists in 1776 who took up arms against the Declara-
tion, the loyal opposition to the Constitution in 1787 fought the good
fight in conventions and not on battlefields. And when outvoted-often
by simple majorities-Anti-Federalists in every single state ultimately ac-
cepted the outcome because deep down, they too understood the Feder-
alists' claim that the Constitution had been legally ratified.19
But not before trying to brand the proposed Constitution "illegal"
early in the game. The "illegal" gambit took two forms. Both gambits
were plausible, but in the end both gambits properly failed.
2. Legality and the Confederation. - The first gambit focused on the
inconsistency between Article VII of the proposed Constitution and Arti-
cle XIII of the Articles of Confederation. 20 Begin with Article VII, the last
section of the Constitution, that explains its first, the Preamble. The Pre-
amble says that 'We the People do ordain and establish this Constitution"
and Article VII says how we do this:
18. For clear, self-conscious discussions of this shift, see 2 Jonathan Elliot, The
Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution
432-33 (J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1881) (1836) [hereinafter Elliot's Debates] (remarks of
James Wilson in Pennsylvania ratifying debates); 4 id. at 229-30 (remarks ofJames Iredell
in North Carolina ratifying convention); 1 The Works of James Wilson, supra note 9, at
77-79; Wood, supra note 6, at 343 (quoting Thomas Tudor Tucker of South Carolina).
These sources are analyzed infra text accompanying notes 58-65.
19. The "illegal" argument cannot account for any of this.
20. I begin with this gambit because it is the best known among citizens and scholars
and the exclusive subject of most legal analysis of the Constitution's legality. What's more,
the ultimate failure of this gambit will lead us directly to the Anti-Federalists' second and
more important gambit focusing on state law and state constitutions. See infra text
accompanying notes 37-61.
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The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States shall be suffi-
cient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States
so ratilying the Same.21
Now contrast Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation:
And the Articles of this confederation shall be inviolably ob-
served by every state, and the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall
any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them;
unless such alteration be agreed to in a congress of the United
States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every
state.
22
These provisions are undeniably inconsistent. The Constitution
speaks of nine states; the Articles, of all thirteen. The Constitution relies
on state conventions, yet the Articles require approval by state legisla-
tures. And make no mistake, Article XIII purports to be exclusive. Un-
like the pointed omission of the word "only" in the Constitution's Article
V, Article XIII clearly regulates "any alteration" of the Articles. The Con-
stitution, of course, was a proposed alteration.
But inconsistency is not illegality. The Articles of Confederation
were nothing more than a tight treaty among thirteen otherwise in-
dependent states-a self-described "firm league of friendship" in which
each state expressly "retains its sovereignty."23 Like the later Congress of
Vienna, its "Congress" was merely an international assembly of ambassa-
dors, sent, recallable, and paid by state governments with each state cast-
ing a single vote as a state. It nowhere described itself as a "Government"
or "legislature," or its pronouncements as "law." By 1787, the Articles had
been routinely and flagrantly violated on all sides.2 4 And under well-es-
tablished legal principles in 1787, these material breaches freed each
compacting party-each state-to disregard the pact, if it so chose. Thus,
Blackstone wrote in his best-selling Commentaries that in a "foederate alli-
ance"-that is, a confederation, or league of otherwise sovereign states-
an infringement of fundamental conditions "would certainly rescind the
compact."25
Nor does Article XIII's declaration that "the Union shall be perpet-
ual" change the analysis, for in fact this clause was itself yoked to a man-
date that the Articles "shall be inviolably observed by every state." Under
standard principles of. international law, each of these yoked mandates
was a condition of the other. When inviolable observation lapsed, so did
perpetual union under the Articles. (Indeed, international law principles
help explain why perpetuity and inviolability were pointedly paired.) To
put the matter another way, the key point about the Confederation was
21. U.S. Const. art. VII (emphasis added). I add this emphasis to highlight the
connection between the Preamble and Article VII.
22. Articles of Confederation art. XIII.
23. Id. arts. I-11I.
24. See, e.g., James Madison, Vices of the Political System, in The Mind of the
Founder 57-59 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1981) [hereinafter Vices].
25. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries 98 note e (added in 1766 edition).
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that it was a league, a treaty. The word "perpetual" said what kind of
league it would be: the strongest, the firmest of leagues-as leagues go-
but a league nonetheless. And the rule Blackstone invoked applied to all
leagues, weak or strong, firm or mushy. In the words of the Swiss jurist
Emmerich de Vattel, whose Law of Nations was widely read and cited in
America, "several sovereign and independent states may unite themselves
together by a perpetual confederacy without each in particular ceasing to
be a perfect state."26
Here then, is a powerful rejoinder to the first "illegal" gambit: the
Constitution did not "illegally" depart from Article XIII because that Arti-.
cle and the other Articles of Confederation were by 1787 no longer le-
gally binding for any state that chose to exercise its legal right to rescind
the compact. This powerful rejoinder is no mere twentieth century
fabrication. On the contrary, when pressed, leading law-trained friends
of the Constitution repeatedly resorted to this rejoinder in 1787-1788.
Having clearly set out the breached treaty argument in the months
before the Philadelphia Convention in his now-famous Vices of the Political
System,27 James Madison wielded the argument as a cudgel in
Philadelphia, early and often-tentatively at first, but with increasing
firmness as the weeks passed. Here is Madison on June 5:
[A]s far as the articles of Union were to be considered as a Treaty
only of a particular sort, among the Governments of Independ-
ent States, the doctrine might be set up that a breach of any one
article, by any of the parties, absolved the other parties from the
whole obligation.28
And two weeks later:
Clearly, according to the Expositors of the law of Nations,... a
breach of any one article, by any one party, leaves all the other
parties at liberty, to consider the whole [compact] as dis-
solved.... [T]he violations of the federal articles had been nu-
merous & notorious .... He did not wish to draw any rigid
inferences from these observations.2 9
On June 30, and more tartly.
26. Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations bk. 1 ch. 1 § 10 (LondonJ. Coote 1760).
The leading modem historian of the era, Gordon S. Wood, agrees with my assessment of
the Articles here. See Wood, supra note 6, at 355.
27. See Vices, supra note 24, at 61. GeneralJedediah Huntington likewise appealed
to the breached treaty argument in May 1787, urging the Connecticut legislature to send a
delegation to Philadelphia: "[T]he compact between the several states has not any penalty
annexed to it for the breach of its conditions.... [Whenever therefore any state refuses a
compliance with a requisition made agreeably to the confederation, all obligation on the
part of the other states is dissolved." Connecticut Courant, May 21, 1787, at 2, reprinted in
13 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 106 (John P. Kaminski
et al. eds., 1981).
28. 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 122-23 (Max Fan-and ed.,
1937) [hereinafter Farrand] (angle brackets deleted).
29. Id. at 315.
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In reply to the appeal of Mr. E. to the faith plighted in the ex-
isting federal compact, he remarked that the party claiming
from others an adherence to a common engagement ought at
least to be guiltless itself of a violation.30
And later still, on July 23, when Madison may well have had his copy of
Blackstone in hand as he sharply distinguished, as had Blackstone, "be-
tween a league or treaty, and a Constitution":
The doctrine laid down by the law of Nations, in the case of
treaties is that a breach of any one article by any of the parties,
frees the other parties from their engagements. In the case of a
union of people under one Constitution, the nature of the pact
has always been understood to exclude such an interpretation. 31
Six months later, as a member of the pseudonymous trio Publius,
Madison penned the Federalist Number 43 for public consumption:
[A question] of a very delicate nature present[s itself] on this oc-
casion: ... On what principle the Confederation, which stands
in the solemn form of a compact among the States, can be su-
perseded without the unanimous consent of the parties to it?
... Perhaps also, an answer may be found without searching
beyond the principles of the compact itself... A compact be-
tween independent sovereigns, founded on ordinary acts of leg-
islative authority, can pretend no higher validity than a league
or treaty between the parties. It is an established doctrine on
the subject of treaties that all the articles are mutually condi-
tions of each other; that a breach of any one article is a breach
of the whole treaty; and that a breach, committed by either of
the parties, absolves the others, and authorizes them, if they
please, to pronounce the compact violated and void. Should it
unhappily be necessary to appeal to these delicate truths for a
justification for dispensing with the consent of particular States
to a dissolution of the federal pact, will not the complaining par-
ties find it a difficult task to answer the multiplied and important
infractions with which they may be confronted? The time has
been when it was incumbent on us all to veil the ideas which this
paragraph exhibits.3 2
The Federalist Papers, of course, enjoyed widespread currency, but
other leading Federalists also developed the breached treaty rejoinder. A
week before the publication of the Federalist Number 43 in New York,
Charleston's Charles Cotesworth Pinckney-who in his youth had studied
law at Oxford under Sir William Blackstone himself-lectured the South
Carolina Convention as follows:
The honorable gentleman says, compacts should be binding,
and that the Confederation was a compact. It was so; but it was a
compact that had been repeatedly broken by every state in the
30. Id. at 485. "Mr. E" here is Oliver Ellsworth.
31. 2 id. at 93.
32. The Federalist No. 43, at 279-80 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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Union; and all the writers on the laws of nations agree that,
when the parties to a treaty violate it, it is no longer binding.33
Pinckney's neighbor to the north, James Iredell-who would soon serve
as Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court-hammered home the
same theme:
Perhaps every state has committed repeated violations of the de-
mands of Congress.... The consequence is that, upon the prin-
ciple I have mentioned, (and in which I believe all writers
agree,) the Articles of Confederation are no longer binding.3 4
Though the Federalists developed the breached treaty rejoinder with
skill and precision, they did not shout it from the rooftops. And, in
Madison's voice at least, we hear a distinct note of restraint. He began at
Philadelphia by noting that the doctrine "might be" set up, and that he
did not "wish to draw any rigid inferences." The question was "very deli-
cate," in the words of Number 43, where he prefaced his exposition with
a pointedly italicized "perhaps" and admitted that he raised the breached
treaty defense "unhappily." But this restraint had nothing to do with law
and everything to do with politics. A breached treaty was voidable, not
void ab initio. A state might have a right to withdraw, but was withdrawal
a wise move-especially if the Constitution failed to be ratified? Perhaps
even a flawed and breached alliance was better than none, and Madison
was not the kind of man to fling off his only garments, however tattered,
before his new suit arrived. What's more, to establish conclusively the
requisite breaches in fact would have required lots of awkward and nasty
fingerpointing-hardly the kind of thing conducive to the launching of a
new nation in the spirit of harmony and good will. Hence Madison's un-
happiness and lack of rigidity, and his cryptic line, "The time has been
when it was incumbent on us all to veil the ideas which this paragraph
exhibits."
But politics aside, the Federalists' rejoinder was an apparent winner,
legally speaking. Over and over Madison referred to established legal
"doctrine"; the legal issue, he said, was "clear[ ] according to the Exposi-
tors of the law of Nations." The breached treaty rejoinder was a "delicate
truth[I." Pinckney appealed to "all the writers on the laws of nations" and
Iredell declared that "all writers agree." These men knew what they were
talking about. And not a single Anti-Federalist, to my knowledge, contra-
dicted them on this key point.3 5 When the issue was joined, the Anti-
33. 4 Elliot's Debates, supra note 18, at 308.
34. Id. at 230. The breached treaty rejoinder also appeared in private
correspondence. See, e.g., Letter from John Brown Cutting to William Short, in 14
Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 492, 497 (Jan. 9, 1788) (John
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1983); Letter from Samuel Holden Parsons to
William Cushing (Jan. 11, 1788), in 1 The Debate on the Constitution 743, 748 (Bernard
Bailyn ed., 1993).
35. Alexander Hamilton had expressed some early reservations about the breached
treaty argument at Philadelphia. See 1 Farrand, supra note 28, at 324-25. But these had
apparently lapsed by the time of his Publian collaboration with Madison, as had his early
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Federalists caved; when pressed to put up or shut up, they shut up.3 6
Their first "illegal" gambit failed, and rightly so.
3. Legality and State Constitutions. - But the very failure of the first
"illegal" gambit leads to the second, far more interesting one. If indeed,
the Articles of Confederation were a mere treaty among otherwise in-
dependent nations,3 7 we must carefully consider the laws of these na-
tions-the thirteen states-and their relation to the Constitution.
Undeniably, the U.S. Constitution, when adopted, would effect important
changes in the internal governance of each state-for example by strip-
ping the state legislature of the power to emit bills of credit, or impair the
obligation of contracts, even if the pre-1787 state constitution authorized
these actions.3 8 The key question thus became, by what legal right would
Article VII ratification of the Constitution in, say, the Maryland Conven-
tion alter the existing Maryland Constitution? The Maryland Constitu-
reservations about the theory of extended republics Madison floated in Philadelphia and
featured in The Federalist Number 10. See id. at 147. But perhaps Hamilton-who
supervised publication of The Federalist Papers in New York-was responsible for the
italicized perhaps in Number 43.
Oliver Ellsworth also resisted Madison's breached treaty argument at Philadelphia,
labelling it "highly dangerous," id. at 335. And "dangerous" it was, as Madison was the first
to admit. But "dangerous" is not "incorrect," and Ellsworth failed to identify any legal flaw
in the argument.
36. As states' rightists, most Anti-Federalists were hardly in a position to rebut the
states' rights gloss placed on the Articles of Confederation by the breached treaty rejoinder
and by the Constitution's own Article VII, see infra note 37.
37. The legally independent status of the states prior to adoption of the Constitution
is supported by all the major legal documents of the era, and by broad historical evidence.
For 150 years prior to independence, the individual colonies had of course been separate,
having been founded at different times and with different, unique charters and forms of
government. The Declaration of Independence proclaimed itself in the name of "free and
independent states"-independent even of each other, save as they chose to concert their
action. Given the predominance of Montesquieu's vision that a single republic could not
extend over a vast geographic, cultural, and climatic range, it is somewhat fanciful to think
that, legally, a continental nation was formed in 1776 with virtually no discussion, and with
the patriots' continental assembly pointedly calling itself a 'congress." The words of
individual state constitutions, and the centrality accorded these documents by
revolutionary Americans, further attest to the independence and sovereignty of states prior
to 1788; and the "sovereignty" of states was, of course, the explicit hallmark of the Articles
of Confederation. So too, the Treaty of Peace with Britain recognized the legal
independence of individual states. Finally-and revealingly-so did Article VII of the
Constitution itself, which made clear that prior to joining the Constitution's "more perfect
union" each state spoke for itself and only itself, and was legally free to go its own way.
Further supporting documentation and analysis appears in Akhil Reed Amar, Of
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1444-62 (1987); and in the definitive
historical account of this period, see Wood, supra note 6, at 354-59.
38. See Letter from James Madison to George Washington (April 16, 1787), in 9 The
Papers of James Madison 385 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1975); 1 Farrand, supra note 28, at
317 (remarks of James Madison); 2 id. 88 (remarks of George Mason); 2 id. 92-93
(remarks of James Madison); 3 id. 229 ("Genuine Information" of Luther Martin before




tion of 1776 had its own explicit amendment clause, and it, too, looked
rather different from the federal Constitution's Article VII:
That this Form of Government, and the Declaration of Rights,
and no part thereof, shall be altered, changed, or abolished, un-
less a bill so to alter, change or abolish the same shall pass the
General Assembly, and be published at least three months
before a new election, and shall be confirmed by the General
Assembly, after a new election of Delegates, in the first session
after such new election.39
Note the obvious differences between this Maryland Constitution
clause and the U.S. Constitution's Article VII. The Maryland clause re-
quires two votes; Article VII, one. The Maryland clause looks to the ordi-
nary Government; Article VII envisions a special convention of the People
of Maryland.
Here, then, was the Anti-Federalists' second "illegal" gambit: (1) the
Maryland Constitution clause specified the exclusive mode by which the
Maryland Constitution could be lawfully altered or abolished; (2) ratifica-
tion of the federal Constitution in Maryland would indeed alter impor-
tant aspects of the state constitution; but (3) the Article VII ratification
mechanism did not satisfy the Maryland exclusive clause. Thus, ratifica-
tion via Article VII would be illegal under pre-existing and binding Mary-
land law.
But once again, the Federalists had a compelling rejoinder. And this
rejoinder has enormous implications for my "First Theorem." As we shall
see, the Federalists argued that the Maryland Constitution clause was best
read as nonexclusive-and the logic underlying this rejoinder strongly
implies that Article V of the federal Constitution is likewise best read as
nonexclusive.
a. Popular Sovereignty. - In the Philadelphia Convention, Maryland's
Daniel Carroll "mentioned the mode of altering the Constitution of
Maryland pointed out therein, and that no other mode could be pursued
in that State."40 But listen carefully to Madison's bold yet lawyerly reply:
The difficulty in Maryland was no greater than in other States,
where no mode of change was pointed out by the Constitu-
tion .... The people were in fact, the fountain of all power, and
by resorting to them, all difficulties were got over. They could
alter constitutions as they pleased. It was a principle in the Bills
of rights, that first principles might be resorted to.41
Whereas Carroll read the Maryland amendment clause as the exclu-
sive mode of lawful constitutional change -"no other mode could be pur-
sued"-Madison read it more narrowly; it specified only the way ordinary
Government could amend the Constitution (by two ordinary votes of two
ordinary legislatures) but did not exclude the People themselves-"the
39. Md. Const. of 1776, art. LIX.
40. 2 Farrand, supra note 28, at 475.
41. Id. at 476.
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fountain of all power"-from altering or abolishing their Government "as
they pleased." Especially revealing is Madison's analogy to those sister
states of Maryland-such as Madison's own Virginia-"where no mode of
change was pointed out by the [state] Constitution." Surely, Madison sug-
gested, that did not mean that the Constitution could never be changed.
It meant only that the People themselves-and not ordinary Govern-
ment-could amend. And so the addition of the Maryland clause gave
ordinary Government an amending power it would not otherwise have
had, but it was not best understood as depriving the People of their pre-
existing background right to alter or abolish at will. For that pre-existing
legal right, proclaimed Madison, was one of the "first principles" of the
legal order.
Madison was not alone in relying on this compelling popular sover-
eignty rejoinder at the Philadelphia Convention. Weeks before
Madison's pointed response to Carroll, we find his Virginia colleague
George Mason-author of the famous Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776, and
soon to become a leading Anti-Federalist opponent of ratification-com-
menting on an early version of Article VII:
[Tihe authority of the people [is] one of the most important and
essential of the Resolutions. The Legislatures have no power to
ratify [the proposed federal constitution]. They are the mere
creatures of the State Constitutions, and cannot be greater than
their creators.... Whither then must we resort? To the people
with whom all power remains that has not been given up in the
Constitution derived from them. It was of great moment...
that this doctrine should be cherished as the basis of free
Government. 4 2
Further support for Madison's "first principle" came even earlier at Phila-
delphia from the unlikely person of Alexander Hamilton, widely viewed
today as no friend of popular government: "[I]f the Legislatures have no
powers to ratify because thereby they diminish their own Sovereignty the
people may come in on revolution Principles."4 3 Or as Madison recorded
the same speech in his notes: "[M]ay not the States themselves in which
no constitutional authority equal to this purpose exists in the Legisla-
tures, have had in view a reference to the people at large."44 Indeed,
Madison's "first principle" was embedded in the Virginia Resolutions in-
troduced at the very outset of the Philadelphia conclave, which explicitly
provided that whatever plan emerged from Philadelphia be submitted "to
an assembly or assemblies . . . to be expressly chosen by the people, to
consider & decide thereon."45
42. Id. at 88.
43. 1 id. at 301. On the possible ambiguity of the phrase "revolution principles," see
Amar, supra note 3, at 1050 n.19. See also 1 The Works ofJames Wilson, supra note 9, at
79 (using phrase "revolution principle" to refer to legal right of popular sovereignty).
44. 1 Farrand, supra note 28, at 283.
45. Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
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During the ratification period, the Carroll-Madison exchange was in
effect reenacted in several states-this time in the public spotlight. Point-
ing to state constitutions, various leading Anti-Federalists played the
"state illegality" card. As had Carroll in Philadelphia, Luther Martin of
Maryland read his state constitution's amendment clause as exclusive, as
emphasized by his own italics:
As our constitution had pointed out a mode by which, and by
which only, alterations, were to be made therein, a convention of
the people could not be called to agree to and ratify the said
form of government, without a direct violation of our constitution
46
In Massachusetts, the state constitution contained a clause calling for a
canvassing of voter sentiment in 1795; if "two-thirds of the qualified voters
... who shall assemble and vote ... are in favor of [a constitutional]
revision," the legislature would be obliged to convene a constitutional
convention.47 According to a Massachusetts Anti-Federalist pamphlet,
the date 1795 was not exclusive, but the rest of its rules were:
Should it be a question, whether an alteration in the Constitu-
tion can be made before the year 1795, there is nothing in the
clause recited, that I can conceive to prevent it: because
although in the year 1795, precepts must issue for the purposes
mentioned, there is no provision to prevent their issuing, if nec-
essary, before that period. But surely, if any alteration should be
made in the Constitution, it must be in a mode provided by the
Constitution itself, for otherwise the clause recited must become a
nullity.48
Likewise, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 contained a clause pro-
viding that in 1783 and "in every seventh year thereafter" a "council of
censors" was to meet, with the power to call a convention for amending
the constitution if "two-thirds of the whole number [of censors] shall
agree."49 Dissenting from the Pennsylvania Convention's ratification of
the U.S. Constitution, leading Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists claimed that
the Pennsylvania clause was indeed exclusive, and that ratification was
thus illegal under Pennsylvania law:
[The Pennsylvania Constitution] cannot legally be altered but by
a recommendation of a council of censors, who alone are au-
thorized to propose alterations and amendments. 50
46. 3 id. at 229.
47. Mass. Const. of 1780, ch. VI, art. X.
48. A Republican Federalist (III), in 4 The Complete Anti-Federalist 169, 172
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) [hereinafter Storing] (emphasis in original). Professor
Storing identifies the likely author as James Warren, Speaker of the Massachusetts House
of Representatives and husband of Mercy Otis Warren.
49. Pa. Const. of 1776, § 47.
50. The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of
Pennsylvania To Their Constituents (Dec. 18, 1787), in 3 Storing, supra note 48, at 145,
149.
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As had Madison at Philadelphia, the Federalists responded vigor-
ously to this Anti-Federalist gambit, playing their popular sovereignty
trump card with flourish. In his first discussion of the Constitution's Arti-
cle VII, Publius trumpeted popular sovereignty with capital letters: "The
fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CON-
SENT OF THE PEOPLE.... that pure, original fountain of all legitimate
authority."5 1 Though echoing Madison in Philadelphia with its descrip-
tion of the people as the "fountain" of all lawful power, Number 22 was in
fact authored by Alexander Hamilton.
But Number 22 appeared before Luther Martin and the
Pennsylvanians had published their accusations of illegality; and so
Publius returned to the gambit in later, more pointed, essays. In Number
39, Madison reminded his readers that the "Constitution is to be founded
on the assent and ratification of the people of America... [and] derived
from the supreme authority in each State-the authority of the people
themselves." 52 In the next number, and more pointedly, Madison wrote:
[I]n all great changes of established governments forms ought to
give way to substance; ... a rigid adherence in such cases to the
former would render nominal and nugatory the transcendent
and precious right of the people to "abolish or alter their gov-
ernments as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety
and happiness,"* .... [The proposed Constitution is] to be sub-
mitted to thepeople themselves, the disapprobation of this supreme
authority would destroy it forever; its approbation blot out ante-
cedent errors and irregularities.
*Declaration of Independence.5 3
Hamilton returned to this theme in his own Federalist Number 78, where
he, too, appealed to the Declaration of Independence's self-evident pop-
ulist truth:
I trust the friends of the proposed Constitution will never con-
cur with its enemies* in questioning that fundamental principle
of republican government which admits the right of the people
to alter or abolish the established Constitution whenever they
find it inconsistent with their happiness .... 54
Lest his audience miss the point that he was directly rebutting the "ille-
gal" gambit, Hamilton dropped a blunt footnote: "*Vde Protest of the Mi-
nority of the Convention of Pennsylvania, Martin's speech, etc." 5
As with his development of the breached treaty rejoinder to the Anti-
Federalists' first "illegal" gambit, Publius did not stand alone in develop-
ing the popular sovereignty rejoinder. Most important were the argu-
ments of James Wilson during the Pennsylvania ratifying convention.
51. The Federalist No. 22, at 152 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
52. Id. No. 39, at 243 (James Madison).
53. Id. No. 40, at 252-53 (James Madison) (footnote in original).




Though less famous today than some of his companions, Wilson deserves
our most careful attention. He was one of only six men to sign both the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. At Philadelphia, he
played a role second-if that-only to Madison. As Gordon Wood has
written, Wilson was the Federalists' preeminent popular sovereignty theo-
rist ;5 6 and it was his hand that first penned the bold first three words of
the Constitution, "We the People."5 7 In the 1780s, Wilson was universally
regarded as perhaps the most brilliant, scholarly, and visionary lawyer in
America. Within three years of the Constitution's ratification, he would
spearhead a successful effort to replace the Pennsylvania Constitution of
1776, serve as one of the first five Associate Justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court, found the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and deliver the
most important and celebrated lectures on law ever given in eighteenth
century America.
Wilson dominated the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, in a one
man tour de force. Early on, he laid down these first principles:
There necessarily exists, in every government, a power from
which there is no appeal, and which, for that reason, may be
termed supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable ....
Perhaps some politician, who has not considered with suffi-
cient accuracy our political systems, would answer that, in our
governments, the supreme power was vested in the constitu-
tions.... This opinion approaches a step nearer to the truth,
but does not reach it. The truth is, that, in our governments,
the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power remains in the
people. As our constitutions are superior to our legislatures, so
the people are superior to our constitutions. Indeed, the superi-
ority, in this last instance, is much greater; for the people pos-
sess over our constitutions control in act, as well as right.
The consequence is, that the people may change the constitutions
whenever and however they please. This is a right of which no positive
institution can ever deprive them.58
This eye-opening last paragraph was no mere slip of the tongue, or
vague theory, for Wilson's very next words reminded his audience that
the ratifying Convention itself-meeting pursuant to the proposed Con-
stitution's Article VII-embodied these first principles. Thus, the legal
word was made flesh:
56. See Wood, supra note 6, at 530 ("More boldly and more fully than anyone else,
Wilson developed the [popular sovereignty] argument that would eventually become the
basis of all Federalist thinking.").
57. 2 Farrand, supra note 28, at 150.
58. 2 Elliot's Debates, supra note 18, at 432 (emphasis added to last paragraph). In
the McMaster and Stone edition of this speech, Wilson goes on to describe this right as "a
power paramount to every constitution, inalienable in its nature." Pennsylvania and the
Federal Constitution 230 (James B. McMaster & Frederick Stone eds., Lancaster, The
Historical Society of Pennsylvania 1888).
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These important truths, sir, are far from being merely spec-
ulative. We, at this moment, speak and deliberate under their
immediate and benign influence. To the operation of these
truths we are to ascribe the scene, hitherto unparalleled, which
America now exhibits to the world-a gentle, a peaceful, a vol-
untary, and a deliberate transition from one constitution of gov-
ernment to another. In other parts of the world, the idea of
revolutions in government is, by a mournful and indissoluble
association, connected with idea of wars, and all the calamities
attendant on wars. But happy experience teaches us to view
such revolutions in a very different light-to consider them only
as progressive steps in improving the knowledge of government,
and increasing the happiness of society.59
Wilson's elaboration of the popular sovereignty rejoinder was not
some newly minted, half baked, ad hoc apology for Article VII. Rather, as
his immediate audience well understood, Wilson's speech built on argu-
ments he and his allies had been crafting in Pennsylvania for almost a
decade. As early as 1777, they had articulated-and acted upon-the
theory that the Pennsylvania amendment clause was not exclusive, and
that popular sovereignty first principles required that the people them-
selves, acting in special conventions, retain the right to change their Con-
stitution at any time and for any reason. 60 "[Did not] the people ...
reserve to themselves the power of approving or disapproving of the con-
stitution, after it was framed?" asked one Pennsylvania paper in June
1777.61
b. Declarations of Rights. - Here then, was the Federalists' emphatic
popular sovereignty rejoinder to the Anti-Federalists' second "illegal"
gambit. Now that we understand its substance, we must investigate its
source: Whence did the Federalists derive these "first principles"?
At one level, the question may be unanswerable, for at some point
first principles are by definition fundamental, and fundamental by defini-
tion. Other principles derive from them, not vice-versa; they stand as the
basic "rule of recognition" underlying every legal order. But on other
levels-sociological and epistemological rather than ontological-we can
go beneath the Federalists' confident invocations of "first principles," and
see the facts and the texts on which the Federalists built, the soil in which
they laid their foundation stone.
For starters, there is of course the text of 1776 Declaration of Inde-
pendence, which Publius quoted, after shearing off its more limited
Lockean language requiring a long train of government abuse. Thus
Madison in Number 43 placed the accent on Jefferson's broad phraseol-
ogy of a right to the people to amend "as to them shall seem most likely
59. 2 Eliot's Debates, supra note 18, at 432-33.
60. See Geoffrey Seed, James Wilson 123-24 (1978); and the eye-opening essay by
Matthew Herrington, Popular Sovereignty in Pennsylvania 1776-1791, 67 Temp. L. Rev.
(forthcoming Fall 1994) (on file with author).
61. Wood, supra note 6, at 444.
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to effect their safety and happiness," which Hamilton in Number 78 para-
phrased as "the right of the people to alter or abolish the established
Constitution whenever they find it inconsistent with their happiness."
Likewise, Wilson stressed that by legalizing the right of revolution-
through peaceful conventions-Americans had broadened the right be-
yond Locke, invocable in the new world "whenever and however [the Peo-
ple] please" to "increas[e] the happiness of society." Wilson elaborated on
this theme at length in his 1790 Lectures on Law, cleverly choosing Black-
stone-who had opposed the American Revolution-rather than the
more popular Locke, or a narrow reading ofJefferson's 1776 Declaration,
as his foil and punching bag.62 James Iredell's remarks in the North Car-
olina ratifying convention also sounded this theme:
In other countries, they suppose the existence of original com-
pact, and infer that if the sovereign [king] violates his part of it,
the people have a right to resist. If he does not, the government
must remain unchanged, unless the sovereign consents to an al-
teration. In America, our governments have been clearly cre-
ated by the people themselves. The same authority that created
can destroy; and the people may undoubtedly change the gov-
ernment, not because it is ill exercised, but because they con-
ceive another form will be more conducive to their welfare. 63
As South Carolina's Thomas Tudor Tucker put the point in 1784, in what
Gordon Wood has described as "one of the most prescient and remarka-
ble pamphlets written in the Confederation period":64
[In America] tumultuous proceedings are as unnecessary as they
would be improper and ineffectual. Other means are in our
hands, as much preferable as good order is to confusion ....
[Whenever the people want to change their constitution] it is
entirely in their power to effect it without the smallest
disturbance.65
Clearly, then, the Federalists' first principles pointed to the text of
the Declaration, butjust as clearly, they played up its popular sovereignty
strains while playing down its more traditional Lockean overtones. (And
if we focus on the Declaration as an act-triggering a violent revolution
without taking a vote of "the People'-the Lockean dimension looms
large.) The Federalists' interpretation was plausible, but needed addi-
tional support. From where?
62. See 1 The Works ofJames Wilson, supra note 9, at 77-79 ("[O]ne great principle,
the vital principle ... is ... that the supreme or sovereign power of the society resides in
the citizens at large; and that, therefore, they always retain the right of abolishing, altering,
or amending their constitution, at whatever time, and whatever manner, they shall deem it
expedient."). See also id. at 317 (similar). For remarkably similar language from an Anti-
Federalist, see Letter from Samuel Adams to John Adams (Nov. 20, 1790), in 6 Works of
John Adams (Charles Francis Adams ed., Boston, Little Brown & Co. 1851).
63. 4 Elliot's Debates, supra note 18, at 229-30.
64. Wood, supra note 6, at 280.
65. Id. at 343 (quoting Tucker's 1784 pamphlet, Conciliatory Hints, Attempting by a
Fair State of Matters, to Remove Party Prejudice).
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Recall once again Madison's precise, lawyerly response to Carroll: "It
was a principle in the Bills of rights, that first principles might be resorted
to." Madison was of course not referring to what we today call "the Bill of
Rights"-the first set of amendments to the federal Constitution-for that
Bill was not even proposed until 1789. What then did he have in mind?
At one level and on one reading, the bill of rights of each state. And
when we closely examine the various bills of rights and declarations of
rights issuing from the states between 1776 and 1790, we will see a dra-
matic pattern: Each state had explicitly endorsed at least one state-
ment-and in many cases several-that established popular sovereignty
as that state's legal cornerstone. These formulations both overlapped
and varied. To ease exposition, I shall quote in full the major texts from
major states, and relegate to footnotes citations to and quotations from
copycat and counterpart language from each sister state.
Here are the opening chords of Virginia's Declaration of Rights-
the first and most influential of all the state declarations, adopted in June
1776, one month before Jefferson's Declaration:
A declaration of rights made by the representatives of the
good people of Virginia, assembled in full and free convention;
which rights do pertain to them and their posterity, as the basis
and foundation of government.
... SEC. 2. That all power is vested in, and consequently
derived from, the people; that magistrates are their trustees and
servants, and at all times amenable to them.
SEC. 3 ... of all the various modes and forms of govern-
ment, that is best which is capable of producing the greatest de-
gree of happiness and safety .... EWihen any government shall be
found inadequate or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the commu-
nity hath an indubitable, inalienable, and indefeasable right to reform,
alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to
the public weal.66
In August 1776, Pennsylvanians promulgated a similar Declaration of
Rights:
III. That the people of this State have the sole exclusive and
inherent right of governing and regulating the internal police
of the same.
IV. That all power being originally inherent in, and conse-
quently derived from, the people; therefore all officers of gov-
ernment, whether legislative or executive, are their trustees and
servants, and at all times accountable to them.
V.... [T]hat the community hath an indubitable, unalienable
and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish government in
such manner as shall be by that community judged most condu-
cive to the public weal.67
66. Va. Const. of 1776 (Declaration of Rights), pmbl., §§ 2-3 (emphasis added).
67. Pa. Const. of 1776 (Declaration of Rights) arts. III-V. See Wayne Township
[Pennsylvania] Petition (Mar. 1, 1788), reprinted in 2 Documentary History of the
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Three months later came a Declaration of Rights from Maryland:
I. That all government of right originates from the people ....
II. That the people of this State ought to have the sole and ex-
clusive right of regulating the internal government and police
thereof.
.*. IV. That all persons invested with the legislative or executive
powers of government are the trustees of the public, and, as
such, accountable for their conduct; wherefore, whenever the
ends of government are perverted, and public liberty manifestly
endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the
people may, and of right ought, to reform the old or establish a
new government 6 8
Consider next the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitu-
tion of 1780:
IV. The people of this commonwealth have the sole and exclu-
sive right of governing themselves as a free, sovereign, and in-
dependent state ....
V. All power residing originally in the people, and being de-
rived from them, the several magistrates and officers of govern-
ment, vested with authority, whether legislative, executive, or
judicial, are their substitutes and agents, and are at all times ac-
countable to them.
.. VII. [T]he people alone have an incontestable, unalienable,
and indefeasible right to institute government; and to reform,
alter, or totally change the same, when their protection, safety,
prosperity, and happiness require it.69
And so it went, more or less, in each of the other nine states.
Delaware's Declaration of Rights in September 1776 presaged neighbor
Maryland's, though Delaware featured extra language emphasizing that
the ends of government might well be threatened by "the Legislative"-
clearly, part of the Government-triggering a right of "the people" to
alter or abolish.70 In December 1776, North Carolina copied Virginia's
and Maryland's general popular sovereignty language,71 while omitting
any specific declaration of the obvious corollary right to alter and abolish.
Georgia, South Carolina, and NewJersey featured general popular sover-
eignty language;72 while Connecticut and New Hampshire tracked their
Ratification of the Constitution 716, 717 (MerrillJensen ed., 1976) ("That as the [state)
Constitution expressly declares that the people have a right to change, alter or abolish
their form of government when they think it will be conducive to their interest or
happiness, your petitioners believe there is ample provision made for any change that may
be occasioned by adopting the proposed Federal Constitution.").
68. Md. Const. of 1776 (Declaration of Rights), arts. I, II, IV.
69. Mass. Const. of 1780, pt. I, arts. IV, V, VII.
70. See Del. Const. of 1776 (Declaration of Rights), §§ 1, 4, 5.
71. See N.C. Const. of 1776 (Declaration of Rights), art. I (condensing Virginia's
Section 2); id. art. II (echoing Maryland's article II verbatim).
72. See Ga. Const. of 1777 pmbl. ("We, therefore, the representatives of the people,
from whom all power originates, and for whose benefit all government is intended, ... do
ordain and declare . . ."); S.C. Const. of 1776, pmbl. ("[S]ome mode [of government]
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Massachusetts neighbor in declaring "the people" of the state "sovereign"
and "independent" with a right to "governing themselves." 73 New Hamp-
shire also went on to echo Maryland's specific language about the right of
"the people" to "reform the old, or establish a new government."7 4 New
York quoted Jefferson's Declaration word for word; and added that "no
authority shall... be exercised over the people.., of this state but such
as shall be derived from and granted by them."75 Finally, even Rhode
Island, whose government simply continued operating under its Crown-
issued charter throughout the confederation period, emphatically en-
dorsed popular sovereignty and its implications in its 1790 ratifying con-
vention, which declared: "That the powers of government may be
reassumed by the people whenever it shall become necessary to their hap-
piness."76 As the Federalist statesman and historian David Ramsay
gushed in his 1791 History of the American Revolution:
It is true, from the infancy of political knowledge in the United
States; there were many defects in their [state] forms of govern-
ment; but in one thing they were all perfect. They left the peo-
ple in the power of altering and amending them, whenever they
pleased.77
At one level and on one reading, Madison's lawyerly response to
Carroll can be understood as follows: "Your own Maryland Bill of rights
explicitly affirms the first principle of popular sovereignty, and its logical
corollary, the right of the people to alter or abolish. Under Maryland
law, properly understood, the Maryland amendment clause is not exclu-
sive; for if it were, it would violate this Maryland-declared right of the
people-it empowers Government, and not the people, to amend." But
this level and reading are too narrow. Madison's lawyerly response was
intended as general, not Maryland-specific. Yet not every state featured
language as explicit as Maryland's; indeed, Rhode Island's clearest expo-
sition came in 1790, three years after the Madison-Carroll exchange. And
even Maryland's language itself featured some Lockean overtones. In-
deed, the very contrast between Maryland's Declaration and Virginia's
should be established by common consent, and for the good of the people, the origin and
end of all governments..."); N.J. Const. of 1776, pmbl. ("I[A] 1 the constitutional authority
ever possessed by the kings of Great Britain over these colonies, or their other dominions,
was, by compact, derived from the people, and held of them, for the common interest of
the whole society.").
73. See Connecticut Declaration of Rights, 1776 pmbl., in 1 Bernard Schwartz, The
Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 289 (1971); N.H. Const. of 1784 (Declaration of
Rights) art. VII.
74. N.H. Const. of 1784, art X; see also id. arts. I, VIII ("all government of right
originates from people" and "[a]ll power resid[es] originally in" and "deriv[es] from the
people").
75. N.Y. Const. of 1777, pmbl., art. I.
76. 1 Elliot's Debates, supra note 18, at 334.
77. 1 David Ramsay, History of the American Revolution 355 (1968 Russell & Russell




broader formulation might seem to undercut Madison. If the various
state declarations were legislative codes, then we might well read them
narrowly, under principles of expressio unius. North Carolina's omission
of any specific right to alter or abolish language might take on special
significance; likewise with Maryland's less expansive formulation than
Virginia's; and so on.
But these state declarations were emphatically not legislative codes.
They did not claim to create new rights but to declare ones the people
already had, in reason or custom or both.7 8 By their very nature, not all
the rights of the people could be specified, and so it would be silly to
make too much of a silence or omission-especially if omitted language
merely clarified a logical corollary of explicit language, as the right of the
people to alter or abolish logically flowed from popular sovereignty.
(The later federal Ninth Amendment would explicitly confirm the silli-
ness of reading Bills of Rights in narrow expressio unius fashion.) And
broader or earlier language from state A did not necessarily confirm the
narrowness or newness of language from state B; on the contrary. These
declarations were quasi-judicial utterances, declaring the true common
law-common to all American states. The various declarations were not
trying to do different things-as legislatures of different states often enact
different, particular statutes-but trying to do the same thing: correctly
define and declare the true contours of various rights. If state A's decla-
ration was actually a better or clearer statement of a truth that other dec-
larations were also haltingly seeking to express, then state A's declaration
was a positive precedent for the other states, not an expressio unius stum-
bling block. The obvious modem day analogy is the particularly persua-
sive and well reasoned common law opinion of well respected judge X
from state A, which is surely entitled to great weight in sister states.7 9
And this is exactly how Madison himself seems to have thought about
the matter; and for him, on this issue at least, the best articulation of the
right came from his own Virginia-the largest state, with the first and
most influential set of declarations, authored by the widely respected
George Mason. For when Madison said to Carroll-"It was a principle in
the Bills of rights, that first principles might be resorted to"-he was in-
voking the particular wording of another well-known provision of
Mason's celebrated Virginia Declaration: "Sec. 15. That no free govern-
ment, or the blessings of liberty, can be preserved to any people, but by a
firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue,
and by frequent recurrence to fundamental principles."8 0 The fact that Mary-
78. In the words of the Anti-Federalist pamphleteer, The Federal Farmer, "We do not
by declarations change the nature of things, or create new truths." Letters from The
Federal Farmer (XVI), in 2 Storing, supra note 48, at 324.
79. For more elaboration of the "declaratory theory" of rights underlying this
paragraph, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and The Fourteenth Amendment, 101
Yale LJ. 1193, 1205-12 (1992).
80. Va. Const. of 1776 (Declaration of Rights) § 15 (emphasis added).
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land had no explicit counterpart in its declaration mattered little, for sec-
tion 15 declared a truth applicable to all "free govemment"-on both
sides of the Potomac. And what was true for Mason and Virginia's section
15 was likewise true of their section 3; it too, counted as a serious prece-
dent for all the other states. How, indeed, could it be otherwise if the
section 3 right of the people to alter or abolish was, as Virginia declared,
"indubitable, inalienable, and indefeasible"? At the very least, a contrary
inference should require an emphatically clear, explicit rejection of this
right from any sister state that found Virginia's broad formulation faulty
and sought to narrow it. None of the states came close to this, unless the
reader falls into the expressio unius trap.
c. Majority Rule. - The broad Federalist rejoinder, then, stressed
that, as a matter of first principles, the people of each state retained the
legal right to alter their government at any time and for any reason.
Clearly this was so in any state that lacked any explicit constitutional
clause setting out a mode of amendment. And in those states that did
have such a clause-Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Massachusetts, for ex-
ample 8 1-the clause simply added an additional mode of amendment
without in any way limiting the people's pre-existing background right to
alter or abolish. Any other reading of the state amendment clause would
violate the state's own first principles, embodied in the state's own decla-
ration of rights, and those of sister states.
One clever counterploy to this Federalist rejoinder would try to read
the various state amendment clauses not as excluding, but as implement-
ing-exclusively!-the people's right to alter or abolish. But this clever
counterploy fails. The Maryland amendment clause empowered ordinary
Government-the legislature-and not the people themselves.8 2 In both
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, the amendment clause specified certain
dates for amendment-in Massachusetts, 1795; in Pennsylvania, every
seven years-whereas first principles required that the people be able to
alter or abolish at any time.83
Sensing this, the pamphleteer who played the illegality gambit in
Massachusetts explicitly conceded, as we have already noted, that 1795
was not exclusive, and need not be read as such. But by similar grammati-
cal logic, the entire amendment clause was nonexclusive; its date was syn-
tactically intertwined with its other rules, and so the concession gave away
the game.
But far more fundamentally, the Massachusetts clause could not be
considered as implementing first principles since the clause expressly re-
quired a supermajority of popular support-and so too, with the
81. See also Del. Const. of 1776, art. 30; Ga. Const. of 1777, art. LXIII; S.C. Const. of
1778, art. XLIV; N.H. Const. of 1784, Pt. II, last para.
82. So, too, in Delaware and South Carolina.
83. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
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Pennsylvania clause 84-- whereas first principles required that a simple ma-
jority of the people be empowered to alter or abolish. This simple major-
ity could occur in a "convention" of the People; popular sovereignty
theory, for good reasons,85 sharply distinguished special conventions-
chosen in a special election of the entire polity,86 for the sole purpose of
effecting constitutional change-from ordinary everyday legislatures
(often chosen by a more restricted electorate), and assimilated these spe-
cial convention assemblies to "the people" themselves. The simple major-
ity rule principle might even be consistent with a requirement that the
people (or conventions) vote on two separate occasions, to ensure that
the majority had truly deliberated, and truly intended the proposed alter-
ation. But, first principles clearly demanded that a simple, deliberate ma-
jority of the polity-fifty percent plus one-would suffice. The
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania clauses clearly failed this requirement,
and thus had to be viewed as nonexclusive as a matter of first principles.
The majority rule corollary of popular sovereignty and the right to
alter or abolish appeared most obviously in George Mason's celebrated
Virginia Declaration, with its explicit emphasis on the "indubitable,
unalienable, and indefeasible" right of "a majority of the community." No
other state declaration addressed the issue explicitly, and clearly none
explicitly took issue with Virginia's Declaration.
This last point is not some lawyer's trick to prevail only by shifting
the burden of proof. In the 17 80s the special status of majority rule was
extraordinarily well understood. Both as a general default rule in the
absence of specific language to the contrary, and as a specific corollary of
popular sovereignty, it literally went without saying in a variety of declara-
tions precisely because it was so obvious. Thus, Jefferson's 1776 Declara-
tion spoke only of "the right of the People to alter or abolish" without
specifying a precise voting rule; but clearly Jefferson believed that popu-
lar sovereignty, best understood, meant majority rule-it went without
saying. Thus, in a now-famous letter to James Madison in December
1787, he wrote:
After all, it is my principle that the will of the Majority should
always prevail. If they approve the proposed [constitution,] I
shall concur in it chearfully, in the hopes that they [i.e., a Major-
ity] will amend it whenever they shall find it work wrong.8 7
84. New Hampshire's amendment clause, based on the Massachusetts model, also had
this defect and likewise specified a certain date for amendment.
85. I have explored these reasons in detail elsewhere. Simply put, there are far fewer
agency costs between convention and people-much like today's Presidential electors. See
Amar, supra note 3, at 1094-95.
86. See supra note 8.
87. Letter from ThomasJefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in The Portable
Thomas Jefferson 432 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975).
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In his first Inaugural Address, Jefferson described "absolute acquiescence
in the decisions of the majority" as "the vital principle of republics."8 8
And in yet another now-famous letter, he wrote:
[The people] alone have a right to direct what is the concern of
themselves alone, and to declare the law of that direction; and
this declaration can only be made by their majority. That major-
ity, then, has a right to depute representatives to a convention,
and to make the Constitution what they think will be the best for
themselves.8 9
Indeed Jefferson believed majority rule to be a logical corollary of equal-
ity, which the Declaration had proclaimed as a "self-evident truth":
The first principle of Republicanism is, that the lex majoris par-
tis is the fundamental law of every society of equal rights. To
consider the will of the society enounced by the majority of a
single vote as sacred as if unanimous is the first of all lessons of
importance. 90
That those views of the Declaration's writer were widely shared by its
readers is nicely illustrated by Joseph Story's landmark Commentaries on the
Constitution, where the great Associate Justice interpolated as follows:
The declaration of independence.., puts the doctrine on its
true grounds.... Whenever any form of government becomes
destructive of these ends, it is a right of the people (plainly in-
tending, the majority of the people) to alter, or to abolish it
91
These views were near universal in the 1780s, for anyone who had
read Locke knew that majority rule stood as a basic default principle of all
assemblies. 92 But more concretely, Americans understood the unique
status of majority rule for implementing popular sovereignty and the
right to alter or abolish. Thus, as early as 1777 we find Pennsylvanians
expressly attacking the exclusivity of the Council of Censors. Though
specially elected by the people for the express purpose of effecting consti-
88. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in The Portable
Thomas Jefferson, supra note 87, at 293.
89. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in The
Portable Thomas Jefferson, supra note 87, at 560.
90. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Baron F. H. Alexander Von Humbolt (June 13,
1817), in 10 The Writings of ThomasJefferson 89 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P.
Putnam's Sons 1899).
91. 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 330
(Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (parenthesis in original).
92. See Locke, supra note 15, at § 96; see also Jefferson, Notes on the State of
Virginia, in The Portable Thomas Jefferson, supra note 87, at 171 ("Lex majoris partis [is)
founded in common law as well as common right. It is the natural law of every assembly of
men.") (citing Brooke, Hakewell, and Pufendorf); Wilmoore Kendall, John Locke and the
Doctrine of Majority-Rule 112 (1959); Wood, supra note 6, at 62-64 (citing Bernard Wishy,
John Locke and the Spirit of '76, 73 Pol. Sci. Q. 413, 413-25 (1958)); Walter Berns, The
Constitution as a Bill of Rights, in How Does the Constitution Secure Rights? 50, 58-59
(Goldwin & Schambra eds., 1985). For still more documentation, see Russell L. Caplan,
Constitutional Brinksmanship 120-21 (1988).
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tutional change-and thus in some respects like a convention-the
Council was malapportioned and operated under a two-thirds rule. A
convention was needed, Wilson and his allies argued, precisely because it
would better reflect "the opinions of the majority."93
To pluck out only a few of the countless examples of the point from
Gordon Wood's magisterial account of the Confederation period,9 4 here
are a couple of essays from the 1783 Connecticut Courant:
[A]s the people had all power originally in themselves, so they
still retain it, to such a degree, that a majority of the people at
large, have a right to reverse and annul every act and contract of
all the legislatures on the continent.95
[It is] impossible [for the Legislature] to impose an irrevocable
act contrary to the majority of the people, from whom they re-
ceived their power.96
And here is Samuel West in his 1776 Massachusetts election sermon:
[I] t is the major part of a community that have the sole right of
establishing a constitution and authorizing magistrates; and con-
sequently it is only the major part of the community that can
claim the right of altering the constitution, and displacing the
magistrates.97
Majority rule continued to hold sway as a self-evident corollary of
popular sovereignty throughout the deliberations over the federal Consti-
tution. At Philadelphia, Elbridge Gerry-another signer of the Declara-
tion of Independence-casually remarked that of course any convention
called by state governments under the rules of Article V would operate by
majority rule, even though the text of Article V nowhere specified this.98
(Once again, it went without saying.) And in another speech at
Philadelphia, Gouverneur Morris mentioned in passing-since the point
was self-evident-that "the Constitution of a particular State may be al-
tered by a majority of the people of the State." 99
During the ratification period, Federalist Noah Webster's pamphlet
described as "a doctrine as universally received, as any intuitive truth" the
proposition "that the opinions of a majority must give law to the whole
State."100 Similarly, Archibald Maclaine declared in the North Carolina
ratifying convention that "because all power is in the people" they had
"the authority . .. to devise such a government as a majority of them
thinks will promote their happiness .... They, sir, have formed their
93. Wood, supra 6, at 443-45.
94. For further examples, see id. at 274, 284, 286, 288, 343, 412, 506, 533.
95. Id. at 368.
96. Id. at 384.
97. Id. at 307.
98. 2 Farrand, supra note 28, at 557-58.
99. Id. at 92.
100. Noah Webster, An Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal
Constitution, by a Citizen of America, in Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United
States 25, 30 (Paul L. Ford ed., n.p. 1888) (emphasis in original).
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state governments and can alter them at pleasure."10' And Publius was
consistent and unequivocal on this point. In the Federalist Number 21,
Hamilton wrote that the federal Constitution's Republican Government
Clause "could be no impediment to reforms of the State constitutions by
a majority of the people in a legal and peaceable mode. This right would
remain undiminished." 10 2 To the same effect was Madison in Number
39:
[T]he majority [of the whole people] in each State must bind the
minority [in framing a Constitution] ....
... Were [the Constitution] wholly national, the supreme and
ultimate authority would reside in the majority of the people of
the Union; and this authority would be competent at all times,
like that of a majority of every national society to alter or abolish
its established government. 10 3
Even Anti-Federalists shared this belief in majority rule as a clear co-
rollary of popular sovereignty. Thus we find the very same Pennsylvania
Anti-Federalists who tried to play the "illegal" card appearing to concede
only a paragraph later that perhaps the Pennsylvania Constitution could
be altered if "a majority of the people should evidence a wish for such a
change."10 4 (The Anti-Federalists denied that such a majority had evi-
denced such a desire, pointing to the low voter turnout in electing con-
vention delegates. The obvious Federalist counterargument would be
that in a properly called election, a majority of those voting-not of those
eligible-should prevail.) 10 5 So too, the Federal Farmer-perhaps the
leading Anti-Federalist pamphleteer-wrote that "[i] t will not be denied,
101. 4 Elliot's Debates, supra note 18, at 161.
102. The Federalist No. 21, at 140 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
see also id. No. 22, at 146 (Alexander Hamilton) (declaring that "fundamental maxim of
republican government... requires that the sense of the majority should prevail"); id. No.
58, at 361 (James Madison) (asserting that majority rule is "the fundamental principle of
free government").
103. Id. No. 39, at 244, 246 (James Madison) (emphasis in original). As we shall see
below, Madison did not believe that the Constitution was ultimately national; he believed
that sovereignty could somehow be divided between state peoples and a national people.
In this belief, Madison was uncharacteristically without followers-and, with good reason.
See infra Part III.G.
See also The Federalist No. 40, at 251 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(explicitly emphasizing that Article VII ratifying conventions are governed by simple
majority rule). For further evidence of Madison's acceptance of the primacy of simple
majority rule, see Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System 208 (1969) (quoting 1833
Madison letter: "the vital principle of republican government is the lex majoris partis, the
will of the majority").
104. The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of
Pennsylvania to Their Constituents, in 3 Storing, supra note 48, at 145-50.
105. See Amar, supra note 3, at 1064 n.78. On the importance of a properly called
election, where strict rules against force and fraud are in place, see id. at 1061 n.67. In an
election not properly called by duly constituted authorities, it is much harder to argue that
those who boycott the election or abstain from voting have surrendered their proxies to
those who do vote. This was the crux of the matter in Dorr's Rebellion in Rhode Island in
the 1840s; see id. at 1053 n.28. For more discussion of all these issues, see Roger Sherman
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that the people have a right to change the government when the majority
chuse it, if not restrained by some existing compact"'10 6-i.e. a valid
treaty. In Virginia the firebrand Patrick Henry seemed to concede that
the proposed Constitution's Article V was in theory not exclusive-a
point to which we shall return-but woried that in practice it would
be. 107 And if exclusive as a practical matter, it would, Henry argued,
clearly violate first principles, for a popular majority might not prevail
under it. Henry quoted Virginia's Third Declaration verbatim, stressing
its commitment to simple majority rule, and labelling it "the genius of
democracy." 108
Perhaps most clear and most dramatic of all were the words of the
great James Wilson. In the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, he at-
tacked the two-thirds rule of the Council of Censors, and repeated his
commitment to simple majority rule in constitutional amendment. 0 9
But his nicest formulation of the point came in his 1790 Lectures on Law
in a passage that was as clear then as it is unknown now:
As to the people, however, in whom sovereign power resides ....
[f]rom their authority the constitution originates: for their
safety and felicity it is established; in their hands it is clay in the
hands of the potter: they have the right to mould, to preserve,
to improve, to refine, and to finish as they please. If so; can it be
doubted, that they have the right likewise to change it? A major-
ity of the society is sufficient for this purpose .... 110
So much for the Founders' words. If we turn instead to their deeds,
we see an even more vivid picture. Article VII as a text nowhere specified
that within each state convention, a simple majority would rule. But this
was the universal understanding in every state. I know of not a single
leading Anti-Federalist who tried to claim that somehow, the convention
should follow supermajoritarian-that is, minority veto-principles. On
the contrary, men like Patrick Henry explicitly conceded that they "must
submit" to the opinion of the convention "majority."11' And in state after
state, Anti-Federalists in the final analysis acted on this understanding,
accepting the legitimacy of the ultimate outcome. The point here,
though often overlooked today, is absolutely vital, for in many states the
convention vote was a squeaker: 30-27 in New York; 187-168 in
Massachusetts; 57-47 in New Hampshire; and 89-79 in Henry's own Vir-
Hoar, Constitutional Conventions: Their Nature, Powers, and Limitations 15-29, 38-57,
76 (1917).
106. Letters From the Federal Farmer (XVII), in 2 Storing, supra note 48, at 330, 336.
107. See 3 Elliot's Debates, supra note 18, at 50-51.
108. Id. at 49-51. See also id. at 55 (stressing simple majority rule for constitutional
amendment).
109. See 2 id. at 457-58. Later, Wilson asked, "[w]ho are the majority in this
assembly-Are they not the people?" Id. at 495.
110. 1 The Works of James Wilson, supra note 9, at 304 (emphasis added). For
further discussion of majority rule in Wilson, see id. at 242; 2 id. at 507-09, 529.
111. See 3 Elliot's Debates, supra note 18, at 50.
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ginia, for example. 112 With so many clever and ardent folk opposed to
ratification, why did no one try to make hay of the omission in the text of
Article VII? Because majority rule really did go without saying. 113
B. The Meaning of the Constitution
Thus the Anti-Federalists' second "illegal" gambit also failed, and
properly so. But we have now reached a critical step in the proof of my
"First Theorem." Though setting out merely to establish the basic legality
of the act of constitution before closely parsing the text of constitution,
we have in fact done much more. We have seen how that act itself re-
flected and embodied-self-consciously-first principles of the legal or-
der, popular sovereignty and majority rule. Further, we have confronted
various state constitutional clauses-from Maryland, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, and elsewhere-that look remarkably like our federal Arti-
cle V. At first blush, these state Article V analogues seemed to set out the
exclusive mode of state constitutional amendment. But after more care-
112. Thus the key voting rule in Article VII is simple majority rule, and not
supermajority rule, as might be inferred from a too casual glance at its seeming 9/13
voting rule. The focus on 9/13 is misleading. To begin with, this is not a true voting rule
at all, since the four dissenting states would not be bound by the nine affirmative states.
The true voting rule occurs within each state, where a simple majority did bind dissenters.
Given that each state was sovereign prior to ratifying the Constitution, the place to look for
the key voting rule is within each state, where a simple majority of the sovereign people did
alter or abolish their pre-existing constitution. The 9/13 provision is thus best understood
as a substantive condition subsequent, modifying what, precisely, the people of each state
were voting for. a new constitution if and only if eight other states agreed, so that the new
scheme could achieve a workable critical mass.
113. Actually Edmund Randolph in the Virginia Convention did say something, when
he thought that the Anti-Federalist minority might try to break a quorum: "[A]n idea of
refusing to submit to the decision of the majority is destructive of every republican
principle." 3 Elliot's Debates, supra note 18, at 597.
In a letter to a youngJohn Quincy Adams (who would one day be President) a young
William Cranch (who would one day be a federal judge and Supreme Court reporter) tried
to appeal to majority rule to overcome Anti-Federalist objections rooted in the Articles of
Confederation: "And respecting the violation of the 13th. Article of the Confederation-
Was not that article made by the majority of the people? & have not the majority of the
people the same right to pass an Article repealing the 13th. Article." Letter from William
Cranch to John Quincy Adams (Nov. 26, 1787), in 14 Documentary History of the
Ratification of the Constitution, supra note 34, at 226. This argument mismatched the
Federalists' second rejoinder to the Anti-Federalists' first gambit, and Adams was apparently
not persuaded. See id. at 228 (Reply Letter of December 8, 1787). Yet Adams, who early
on opposed the Constitution, later seemed to echo Cranch's ode to majority rule popular
sovereignty. Upon hearing of the ratification of the Constitution, young Adams wrote in
his diary: "I think it my duty to submit .... In our Government, opposition to the acts of a
majority of the people is rebellion to all intents and purposes." Id. at 220 (entry of Feb. 7,
1788). The timing of Adams's apparent turnaround corresponds precisely with the
publication of the Federalist Nos. 39-43, which straightened out two distinct arguments
young Cranch had collapsed. Published in January 1788, Number 43 explained why
Massachusetts was legally free to abandon Article XIII and the Articles, and Numbers
39-40 explained why a simple majority of the Massachusetts people could alter or abolish
their state constitution, in keeping with popular sovereignty first principles.
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ful inspection, we learned that these Article V analogues were not best
read as exclusive. As a matter of first principles, the polity had retained
the legal right to alter or abolish outside these analogues by simple major-
ity vote.
And so the obvious question is, why is the same not true for Article V
itself? Why does not a simple majority of the national People-for the
Constitution forms one national People from the formerly distinct thir-
teen state peoples-retain an analogous legal right to alter or abolish its
Constitution outside Article V?114 (Once again, Article V cannot be read
as implementing that right, because it is both Government-driven and mi-
noritarian; its rules may well thwart sensible constitutional changes
strongly desired by a deliberate majority of the American polity.)115
A strict textualist might insist that even if this right exists as a matter
of first principles, we must locate it somewhere in the text of the Constitu-
tion itself-though not necessarily within the four comers of Article V-
before we can call this right of the people a true constitutional right sepa-
rate from, but equal to, Article V. 1 6 It is tempting to quibble with the
textualist here by reminding her that all texts derive their meaning from
larger historical contexts, acts, and language patterns; and that the Con-
stitution's larger context-the very act of constitution itself, and the lan-
guage of popular sovereignty in which that act was inextricably and self-
consciously embedded-made clear that majority rule popular sover-
eignty must be part of the Constitution. A further quibble might remind
the strict textualist that we have indeed found legal texts-the thirteen
state declarations-attesting to the legal (and not merely philosophical,
or speculative) nature of the right of majority rule popular sovereignty;
and that those texts declared legal truths believed applicable, inalienable,
and indubitable in all free governments.
114. I intentionally gloss over some important federalism issues here, which I have
addressed in considerable detail elsewhere, and to which I shall return at the end of this
essay.
115. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. We should not be led astray by
Article V's reference to state ratifying conventions. After 1788, the relevant sovereign
People was not the people of each state, but the People of the United States. See infra
notes 117-118 and accompanying text; Part III.G. Indeed, Article V is itself strong
evidence that after ratification of the federal Constitution, the people of, say, Virginia,
would no longer be sovereign; for if sovereign, Virginia could not be bound by any later
amendment the Virginia people rejected in convention assembled, even one ratified by
every other state convention. Yet Article V clearly says that Virginia would be bound in this
situation. Thus, the dramatic contrast between Article VII's treatment of state
conventions-where no state convention could bind a sister state-and Article V's
treatment marks the shift upon ordainment and establishment of the U.S. Constitution
from state to national popular sovereignty achieved by a "Union" (or merger) of previously
separate states.
Article V ratifying constitutions are thus not the sovereign people, but subordinate
assemblies interchangeable with state legislatures for Article V purposes.
116. In fact this constitutional right is in certain respects even higher than Article V,
though inside the Constitution. See infra Part III.B.
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But let us put aside such quibbles, for there are indeed clear texts in
the United States Constitution-texts outside Article V but very much in-
side (indeed, fundamental to) the Constitution, understood as a unified
document-that confirm the right we have rediscovered. When properly
read, these texts say the very same thing and serve the very same function
at the national level as the state declarations in the context of state Article
V analogues.
1. The Preamble. - Begin at the beginning. Do not the words-"We
the People of the United States... do ordain and establish this Constitu-
tion"-say it all? What We, acting by simple majority in convention as-
sembled (see Article VII), have ordained and established, cannot We,
acting similarly, alter or abolish? Of course, because the Constitution
formed previously separate state peoples into one continental people-
Americans!-by substituting a true (and self-described) Constitution for a
true (and self-described) league, the relevant majority after ordainment
and establishment should be national, not state by state, as it was before
ordination and establishment, under Article VII. An easy modem day
analogy comes from corporate law: company A and company B agree to
merge, with the merger approved by lawful majorities of each company's
shareholders; but after merger, we look to the lawful majority of share-
holders of the newly formed company, United A&B. n 7 (And we should
not forget that Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Connecticut had them-
selves each been formed by mergers of previously separate colonies, prior
to the American Revolution.) 118 To be sure, the Constitution redefined
the relevant polity, but that redefinition cannot change the basic nature
of popular sovereignty. If it did, no state prior to 1787 could have been
grounded on popular sovereignty, for every new day brought a slight re-
definition of the polity, with some voters dying and others coming of age,
with western borders being relentlessly pushed back and new settlers
brought in.
But of course, every text finds itself embedded in an historical con-
text. Did the Founders themselves recognize the Preamble as a textual
declaration of popular sovereignty and the people's right to alter or abol-
ish? Indubitably. For Publius, no federal Bill of Rights was necessary be-
cause, as Hamilton wrote in Number 84:
Here, in strictness, the people surrender nothing; and as they
retain everything, they have no need of particular reservations,
"WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, to secure the blessings
of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish
this Constitution for the United States of America." Here is a
[clear] recognition of popular rights .... 119
117. See supra note 115; infra Part III.G.
118. See 1 Farrand, supra note 28, at 462 (remarks of Nathaniel Ghoram).




And what "right" was more "popular" than popular sovereignty? Recall
once again Iredell's speech in the North Carolina ratifying convention
yoking the right to ordain and establish with the right to alter or abolish:
"In America, our governments have been clearly created by the people
themselves. The same authority that created can destroy; and the people
may undoubtedly change the government."120 And listen with special
care to the man who wrote the first draft of the Preamble, James Wilson:
[T] he leading principle in the politics [sic], and that which per-
vades the American constitutions, is, that the supreme power re-
sides in the people. This Constitution... opens with a solemn
and practical recognition of that principle: - "We, the people of
the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish
justice, &c., do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America." It is announced in their name-it
receives its political existence from their authority: they ordain
and establish. What is the necessary consequence? Those who
ordain and establish have the power, if they think proper, to
repeal and annul.121
And as we know from Wilson's other remarks, Wilson clearly meant here
majority rule popular sovereignty.
In yet another remarkable speech, the great lawyer and Virginia con-
vention President Edmund Pendleton invoked the Preamble as proof
that the people would retain a legal right to alter or abolish. Article V,
said Pendleton, simply set out one "easy and quiet" mechanism of amend-
ment; but because it was Government-driven, it could not be exclusive:
We, the people, possessing all power, form a government, such
as we think will secure happiness: and suppose, in adopting this
plan, we should be mistaken in the end; where is the cause of
alarm on that quarter? In the same plan we point out an easy
and quiet method of reforming what may be found amiss. No,
but, say gentlemen, we have put the introduction of that
method in the hands of our servants, who will interrupt it from
motives of self-interest. What then? ... Who shall dare to resist
the people? No, we will assemble in Convention; wholly recall
our delegated powers, or reform them so as to prevent such
abuse; and punish those servants who have perverted powers,
designed for our happiness, to their own emolument. 122
The leader of the Virginia Anti-Federalists, Patrick Henry, appeared to
concede Pendleton's legal analysis, but predicted that a federal standing
arny would prevent the people from ever exercising their legal right to
"assemble" in Convention. 123 In light of the Pendleton-Henry exchange,
the declaration issued by the entire Virginia Convention to accompany its
120. 4 Elliot's Debates, supra note 18, at 230.
121. 2 id. at 434-35 (emphasis in original).
122. 3 id. at 37. Logic suggests that Pendleton is referring here to a convention
outside Article V, see Amar, supra note 3, at 1056-57.
123. See 3 Elliot's Debates, supra note 18, at 51.
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ratification takes on added significance: "[T] he powers granted under the
Constitution, being derived from the people of the United States, may be
resumed by them, whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury
or oppression." 124
And if we need still further proof, we shall find it in the first Con-
gress, where James Madison proposed various "declaratory and restric-
tive" amendments to the Constitution.125 Although our federal "Bill of
Rights" was eventually tacked on to the end of the original document,
Madison initially proposed to interweave new clauses directly into the
original fabric. One of these proposals was to append a prefix to the
Preamble which included the following: "That the people have an indu-
bitable, unalienable and indefeasible right to reform or change their Gov-
ernment ... ."126 Not one Representative quarrelled with Madison on
the substance of this claim, but the prefix was eventually dropped pre-
cisely because its detractors deemed it redundant, given the broad mean-
ing of the Preamble itself. Thus James Jackson of Georgia-whose own
state constitution merely contained general popular sovereignty lan-
gnage127-declared that the Preamble's "words, as they now stand, speak
as much as it is possible to speak; it is a practical recognition of the right
of the people to ordain and establish Governments, and is more expres-
sive than any other mere paper declaration."128 Likewise John Page ar-
gued that the original Preamble "had the neatness and simplicity, while
its expression was ... most forcible." 129 John Vining from Delaware went
even further:
A bill of rights was unnecessary in a Government deriving all its
powers from the people; and the constitution enforced the prin-
ciple in the strongest manner by the practical declaration pref-
aced to that instrument; he alluded to the words, 'Ve the
people do ordain and establish."130
Finally, consider the words of Roger Sherman, another member of the
select six-man club of Declaration and Constitution signers:
The people of the United States have given their reasons for
doing a certain act. Here we propose.., to let them know that
they had a right to exercise a natural and inherent privilege,
which they have asserted in the solemn ordination and establish-
ment of the constitution. Now, if this right is indefeasible, and
the people have recognized it in practice, the truth is better as-
serted then it can be by any words whatever. The words 'We the
people" in the original constitution, are as copious and expres-
124. 1 id. at 327.
125. See 2 Schwartz, supra note 73, at 1164.
126. Id. at 1026.
127. See supra note 72.
128. 2 Schwartz, supra note 73, at 1072.
129. Id. at 1077. Though Page thought the Preamble "no part of the Constitution,"
id., his views on that point were incorrect and atypical.
130. Id. at 1041.
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sive as possible; any addition will only drag out and lengthen the
sentence without illuminating it 13 1
2. The Ninth and Tenth Amendments. - Closely related to the Pream-
ble were words that eventually became the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments:
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people.
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.'3 2
Conventional wisdom misses this close triangular interrelation. The
Ninth is said to be about unenumerated individual rights, like personal
privacy; the Tenth, about federalism; and the Preamble, about something
else again. But look again at these texts. All are at their core about popu-
lar sovereignty. All, indeed, explicitly invoke "the people." In the Pream-
ble, "We the people . . .do" exercise our right and power of popular
sovereignty, and in the Ninth and Tenth "the people" expressly "retain"
and "reserve" our "right" and "power" to do it again. If the Ninth is
mainly about individual rights, why does it not speak of individual "per-
sons" rather than the collective "the people"? If the Tenth is only about
states' rights, why does it stand back-to-back with the Ninth, and what are
its last three words doing there, mirroring the Preamble's first three?
The legislative history of these amendments confirms their close in-
terrelations with each other and with the Preamble, and their obvious
implications for the people's right to alter or abolish, as revealed by even
a casual glance at the initial formulations of these principles in the
Virginia and New York ratifying conventions. First, Virginia:
[T]he powers granted under the Constitution, being derived
from the people of the United States, may be resumed by them,
whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury or op-
pression, and that every power not granted thereby remains with
them, and at their will; that, therefore, no right.., can be can-
celled, abridged, restrained, or modified by [the U.S. govern-
ment] except in those instances in which power is given by the
Constitution for those purposes.' 33
Next, New York:
That all power is originally vested in, and consequently derived
from, the people, and that government is instituted by them for
their common interest, protection and security ....
That the powers of government may be reassumed by the peo-
ple whensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness;
131. Id. at 1077.
132. U.S. Const. amends. IX, X.
133. 1 Elliot's Debates, supra note 18, at 327. Leading works on the Tenth
Amendment almost never mention this key text, and often gloss over the words "the
people" in the Tenth Amendment.
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that every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is'not by the said
Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United
States, or the departments of the government thereof, remains
to the people of the several states, or to their respective state
governments, to whom they may have granted the same; and
that those clauses in the said Constitution, which declare that
Congress shall not have or exercise certain powers, do not imply
that Congress is entitled to any powers not given by the said
Constitution; but such clauses are to be construed either as ex-
ceptions to certain specified powers, or as inserted merely for
greater caution. 134
Recall that Hamilton prefaced his discussion of the Preamble in The
Federalist Number 84 with the words "Here, in strictness the people...
retain everything, [so] they have no need of particular reservations."135 Re-
call also Wilson's Pennsylvania convention speech that "supreme . . .
power remains in the people"' 36-a point he formulated a bit later as fol-
lows: The people "never part with the whole" of their "original power...
and they retain the right of recalling what they part with. ... [T] he citi-
zens of the United States may always say, WE reserve the right to do what
we please." 3 7
Finally, consider the remarks of South Carolina Representative
Thomas Tudor Tucker in the First Congress, when an early version of the
Tenth Amendment was under discussion:
Mr. Tucker proposed to amend the proposition, by prefixing to
it "all powers being derived from the people." He thought this a
better place to make this assertion than the introductory clause
[i.e. Preamble] of the constitution, where a similar sentiment was
proposed by the committee. 138
Eventually, of course, the same point was made by the Amendment's last
three words.' 3 9
3. The Right of the People to Assemble. - The popular sovereignty motif
sounded by the words "the People" in the Preamble and Amendments
Nine and Ten should attune us to the words and the music elsewhere in
the Constitution. And once attuned, we hear another clear affirmation of
the first principles of majority rule popular sovereignty: the First Amend-
ment "right of the people to assemble."
As Gordon Wood has observed, "conventions... of the people...
were closely allied in English thought with the people's right to assem-
134. Id.
135. Quoted supra text accompanying note 119 (emphasis added).
136. Quoted supra text accompanying note 58 (emphasis in original).
137. 2 Elliot's Debates, supra note 18, at 437 (emphasis added). Note how Wilson's
capital WE ties back to the Preamble, while his other language anticipates the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments.
138. 2 Schwartz, supra note 73, at 1118.
139. The precise chronology of this insertion is uncertain. See Edward Dumbauld,
The Bill of Rights And What It Means Today 42 n.32 (1957).
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ble"'14 0-thus, for example, we find Blackstone describing how in 1688
the British people, through Parliament "assemble [d]" in "Convention."141
And in revolutionary America, we almost invariably find the ideas and
words "people," "assemble," and "convention" tightly clustered in discus-
sions of popular sovereignty. 142 Indeed, we have already seen several of
these countless clusters. Recall, for example, the opening words of the
Virginia Declaration of 1776;143 the wording of the Philadelphia Conven-
tion's initial version of Article VII;'4 and Edmund Pendleton's pointed
phrase that if dissatisfied with Article V, "the people" will "assemble in
convention"145-clustered words repeated by Patrick Henry in his appar-
ent concession of the point.146 Consider also the clear statement of Anti-
Federalist John Smilie in the Pennsylvania Convention:
I take it, sir, that even after this Convention shall have agreed to
ratify the proposed plan, if the people on better information and
maturer deliberation should think it a bad and improper form
of government, they will still have a right to assemble another body
[i.e., a Convention] ... to abrogate this federal work so ratified
. ... [So] a worthy member of the late Convention (James
Wilson] admits when he says, the people have at all times a
power to alter and abolish government .... 147
Members of the first Congress clearly understood all this in 1789, as evi-
denced by a casual reference in Congress itself to the "assembling of a
convention." 148 Thus, a core meaning of "the right of the people to as-
semble" in 1789 was their right to assemble in convention.149 To be sure
this was not the only meaning, for the text radiated beyond this core, just
as the text of the Ninth Amendment radiated beyond the core right of
the people to popular sovereignty. But there is no doubt that in both
places, the words "the people" do indeed mean-at least-just that.
III. OBJECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
We have now completed the initial proof of my "First Theorem." Just
as first principles and various state declarations required us to rethink
and ultimately reject the seeming exclusivity of state analogues to Article
140. Wood, supra note 6, at 312.
141. See 1 William Blackstone, supra note 25, at 153-54.
142. Further documentation appears in Amar, supra note 3, at 1058-60; and Akhil
Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1152-55 (1991).
143. See supra text accompanying note 66.
144. See supra text accompanying note 45.
145. See supra text accompanying note 122.
146. See supra text accompanying note 123.
147. 2 Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, supra note 34, at
376 (emphasis added) (final brackets in original).
148. 2 Schwartz, supra note 73, at 1022 (remarks ofJohn Page).
149. See, e.g., Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 249-50 (1833) (finding that
"a convention could have been assembled" to amend state constitutions); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819) (describing "the people ... assembled" in
.convention" in the "several states" to ratify constitution).
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V, so too do first principles and various other parts of the federal Consti-
tution require us to abandon the seeming exclusivity of Article V itself.150
But this result no doubt unsettles and disorients. If correct, we need
to seriously rethink much of constitutional law. But can it really be cor-
rect? Have we taken a wrong turn somewhere? Let's go back and con-
sider a few possible objections.
A. The Novelty Objection
"Amar's First Theorem cannot be right. It is a huge claim, going to
the very essence of our constitutional order. If correct-or even plausi-
ble-surely someone would have offered it before, or even tried to act
upon it. It is just too novel to be true."
Novel to whom? Surely not to We the People of 1787 who did ordain
and establish our Constitution-for as I hope I have shown, they under-
stood and self-consciously acted upon the First Theorem and its underly-
ing principle of majority rule popular sovereignty. To repeat the words
of that pre-eminent legal theorist James Wilson: "The consequence is,
that the people may change the constitutions whenever and however they
please. This is a right of which no positive institution can ever deprive
them."' 5 1 "A majority of the society is sufficient for this purpose."15 2
But the "First Theorem" will no doubt seem novel to many of us
today-even (or perhaps especially) lawyers, judges, and scholars. But is
it possible that the novelty is rooted in our own ignorance?
For example, we have not been taught-in high school civics, in col-
lege classrooms, in Supreme Court opinions, or even in law school
casebooks and law reviews, just how central James Wilson was to the
Founding generation, and to the Founding itself. Serious students of the
Constitution pore over every nuance of The Federalist Papers, but how
many of us have spent even a fraction of time studying James Wilson's
equally influential, broad and deep speeches and lectures from 1787 to
1791?
And could it be that our entire perspective on the place of majority
rule in our Constitution is askew? Preoccupied with the "coun-
termajoritarian difficulty" posed by judicial review, the last generation of
constitutional scholars spun ever more elaborate theories about the most
"filtered" parts of the Constitution-such as Article III-yet all but ig-
nored its most directly majoritarian clauses, such as the Preamble and
Article VII. Rather than dwelling only on whether and how unelected
judges can create or evolve new individual rights, we need to see how the
150. Ultimately, my claim is not narrowly intentionalist, but structural. Even if many
Framers failed to appreciate all the implications of their constitution, the logic of that
constitution, in both word and deed, supports my claim. And the most clear-eyed and
important constitutional architect of popular sovereignty, James Wilson, dearly did
understand-and sought to expound-that logic.
151. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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People ordained the supreme law by majority rule popular sovereignty
and to ask, could the People do this again?
Indeed, we have spent far too little attention generally pondering the
processes of constitutional change.' 53 Article III, various individual
rights, and much of the rest of the Constitution could in theory be
amended away. Analytically, much of our existing constitutional order
exists in the shadow of constitutional amendment rules, yet these rules
have received far less serious theoretical attention than their special sta-
tus demands. And to understand how the Constitution can be legally
amended, we must better understand how it was legally brought into
existence. The majoritarian Preamble and Article VII-literally the origi-
nal Constitution's textual and performative alpha and omega-stand on
an analytically higher plane than "countermajoritarian" provisions like
those in Article III.M
When sophisticated theorists do touch on the Preamble, or Article
VII, it is too often with a cynical smirk on their lips: who but a rube could
take seriously the winkingly democratic phrase, "We the People"? But-
Charles Beard notwithstandingl 55-the act of the constitution was not
some antidemocratic, Thermidorian counterrevolution, akin to a coup
d'etat, but was instead the most participatory and majoritarian event the
planet had ever seen (and lawful to boot). Looking backwards from to-
day, we see all the painful exclusions-of women, of slaves-but often
miss the breadth of inclusion, looking backwards from 1787.156
153. For a recent attempted corrective, see generally Michael S. Paulsen, A General
Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103
Yale L.J. 677 (1993).
154. And also than Article V itself, which is best read as a revocable delegation of
special lawmaking power to ordinary government, akin to, but more powerful than, Article
I delegation, yet ultimately subordinate to the people themselves. Indeed, though not
definitively answering all Article V conundra, the framework and evidence presented in
this essay throw light on some of the important Article V issues identified earlier, see supra
notes 9-10 and accompanying text. An Article V proposing convention should follow
majority rule (it goes without saying) and be apportioned by national population. An
amendment outside Article V could modify Article V rules, but could not eliminate the
non-Article V right of a majority to make future amendments, since that right is
inalienable, and constitutive of the Constitution's popular sovereignty essence. The very
logic of popular sovereignty both empowers amendments in general, yet prevents
"unamendable" Amendments. This logic itself, of course, from one perspective constitutes
a kind of unamendability. This is the paradox of sovereignty-akin to the theological
paradox concerning God's sovereign ability to bind God's self (if God is omnipotent, can
She create a rock so heavy She cannot lift it)-but a paradox at the heart of self-rule. Cf.
Charles L. BlackJr., The People and the Court 223-25 (1960). Even if the people of one
generation could bind itself to an "unamendable" or extraordinarily-difficult-to-amend
substantive provision, by what right could the people of one generation so bind the next?
155. See generally Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution
of the United States (1913).
156. Again, suffrage rules for constitutional ratification were broader than those
applicable for ordinary legislative elections. See supra note 8 and accompanying text;
supra text accompanying note 86.
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Americans did not receive their supreme law from On High, from some
Great Man claiming a pipeline to God-Moses, Solon, Lycurgus-or
from some conclave of fifty-five demigods in Philadelphia (which merely
proposed a piece of paper).157 Nor did Americans simply inherit their
supreme law from immemorial custom. Rather, Americans did ordain
and establish their supreme law-peacefully, deliberately, and lawfully-
by majority rule popular sovereignty. The act electrified Europe and
doomed the ancien regime.
The novelty objection, in short, suffers from remarkable amnesia
concerning the Constitution's words and deeds. Conventional wisdom
about the federal Bill of Rights is not much better. Mainstream scholars
and citizens stress the Bill's commitment to individual and minority
rights, but miss its even larger majoritarian and populist themes15 8-
themes also evident in the state declarations quoted and discussed above.
How could the mainstream forget, for example, that no phrase appears in
more of the first ten amendments than "the people"?
The obvious overlaps between state declarations of rights and the
federal Bill should remind us of the general importance of the state con-
stitutional experience in shaping American constitutional discourse. Yet
here, too, the mainstream suffers from amnesia. To my knowledge, no
modern legal scholar has carefully examined the state Article V analogues
from 1787 and pondered their significance for Article V itself. And per-
haps because of the pervasive nationalism of today's law schools, few con-
stitutional scholars are even aware of the dramatic pattern of majority
rule popular sovereignty in amending state constitutions after 1787.
In 1790, for example, James Wilson and his allies succeeded in con-
vening a special convention to replace the Pennsylvania constitution of
157. The Federalists repeatedly emphasized that the Philadelphia Convention's
proposal was merely a piece of "paper" until ratified and made law by the people,
assembled in special ratifying conventions. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 40, at 252 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); 2 Elliot's Debates, supra note 18, at 470 (remarks of
James Wilson in Pennsylvania ratifying Convention) (equating proposed Constitution with
a "production... flowing from a private pen"); 4 id. at 23 (remarks of William R. Davie at
North Carolina ratifying convention) (similar); id. at 24 (remarks of William Maclaine at
North Carolina ratifying convention) ("The Constitution is only a mere proposal."); id. at
206 (remarks of Richard D. Spaight at North Carolina ratifying convention) (similar); 3 id.
at 38 (remarks of Edmund Pendleton at Virginia ratifying convention) (similar). For
further documentation and discussion, see Elaine Scarry, War and the Social Contract:
Nuclear Policy, Distribution, and the Right to Bear Arms, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1257, 1271 &
n.39, 1313-14 (1991). Even though proposing a new Constitution did go beyond the
Philadelphia delegates' commissions, as Madison explicitly admitted in The Federalist No.
40, he nowhere conceded that the mere proposal was somehow "illegal," as Professor
Ackerman erroneously claims. See Ackerman, supra note 13, at 328 n.4. For those who
believe in free expression, the worst one could say about the proposal was that it was
"void"-a legal "nullity" perhaps, but hardly "illegal." (Ackerman's implicit theory of
"illegality" here is a scary one indeed.) And Madison's argument is that the proposal is
indeed of zero legal significance-unless and until ratified by the People and thereby
made supreme law.
158. See generally Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, supra note 142.
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1776, despite arguments that the council of censors clause was exclu-
sive.159 Whence this second, majority rule popular sovereignty mode,
outside Pennsylvania's Article V analogue? "A Freeman" in the Federal
Gazette furnished the answer-" [T] he [state] Constitution itself admits and
maintains the never ceasing power of the People to change their frame of
government"-and proceeded to quote the Declaration of Independence
and the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776.160 To similar effect were the
Gazette's editors:
[W]hen the people prescribed in the constitution a council of
censors, as the ordinary mode of altering that civil compact, they
reserved in express terms the right of altering it at any time and
any manner they should see fit. From hence it is clear, that how-
ever constitutional a council of censors will hereafter be, a con-
vention of the people were equally constitutional, in December,
1788 [to ratify the federal Constitution], and will be so in the
present year-This power of electing a convention at all times,
to alter the constitution of a state, is a never dormant-never
ceasing uncontrollable right of the people.161
The following year, Delaware followed suit, holding a constitutional
convention in the teeth of its own seemingly exclusive Article V analogue;
and this was only the beginning. As Massachusetts Assistant Attorney
General Roger Sherman Hoar-whose Founding era namesake we have
already encountered-documented in a 1917 book, innumerable amend-
ments to state constitutions occurred in countless states in the nineteenth
century by modes of popular majority action not explicitly authorized by
pre-existing state constitutions, and often in the teeth of what at first
seemed exclusive Article V analogues.' 62 Here is what one of Hoar's ear-
liest predecessors, William Rawle, wrote in his famous treatise on the fed-
eral Constitution in the 1820s:
[T]he people retains-the people cannot perhaps divest itself, of
the power to make [constitutional] alterations. A moral power
equal to and of the same nature with that which made, alone
can destroy ... So the people may, on the same principle, at
any time alter or abolish the constitution they have formed.
This has been frequently and peaceably done by several of these
states since 1776. If a particular mode of effecting such alterations is
agreed on, it is most convenient to adhere to it, but it is not exclusively
159. The material in this paragraph derives from Matthew Herrington's important
manuscript, supra note 60, at 53-54.
160. Id. at 54 (quoting A Freeman, Federal Gazette, Mar. 28, 1789).
161. Id. at 54 n.114 (quoting Federal Gazette, Mar. 28, 1789) (emphasis added). See
also id. at 56.
162. See Hoar, supra note 105, at 39-40 (listing 34 conventions held before 1917 in
18 states whose constitutions did not explicitly authorize them). This book is a must read
for those who continue to have doubts about the nonexclusivity of state Article V
analogues.
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binding. We shall hereafter see the careful provision in this re-
spect contained in the constitution of the United States.' 63
In short, both in word and in deed, majority rule popular sovereignty
was alive and well throughout the nineteenth century, if we only know
where to look.'6
To take one final example, the theory ofJefferson Davis and his fel-
low secessionists in 1861 was simple and clear: (1) Article V is not the
exclusive mode of legitimate constitutional change; (2) We the People
retain the right to alter or abolish our government at any time, and for
any reason; (3) We the People exercise this right by simple majority rule
in special convention; and (4) the relevant people is the people of each
state. This was a theory that hundreds of thousands fought and died for.
And, as I understand him, President Lincoln crossed swords with
"President" Davis only over proposition Number 4, insisting-quite
rightly, in my view-that secession could take place only if approved by a
national majority, and not a mere statewide one.
B. The Legal Objection
"Perhaps the people do have a right to alter or abolish their govern-
ment outside Article V, but this right is not a legal right, a constitutional
right. It is something else-supra-constitutional, extralegal, natural, phil-
osophical, or revolutionary, perhaps, but definitely not legal and constitu-
tional in the way that Article V is."
Why not? Surely the Constitution could have said, in so many words:
"Article V is not exclusive. The People retain the legal right to change
the Constitution by legal mechanisms akin to the legal mechanisms by
which they ordained and established it." My claim is that the Constitu-
tion is best read as saying exactly this, only in different words-the Pre-
amble, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, and so on-and in the act of
legal ordainment and establishment itself.
163. William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America 12
(Philadelphia, H.C. Carey & I. Lea 1825) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
164. These vigorous assertions of majority rule popular sovereignty should put to rest
the notion that the right of the people to alter and abolish somehow lapsed through
desuetude or nonuse after 1789.
The desuetude argument is troubling on other grounds as well. Does the nonuser of
two of Article V's four paths mean that they too have somehow lapsed? (As we have seen,
majority rule popular sovereignty is no less a part of our Constitution than, say, Article V.)
Does the fact that the People have not felt the need to invoke a particular right mean that
they have explicitly waived it? Forever? Even if We the People could waive our own right
to alter or abolish, how could we waive our grandchildren's-especially given that the very
logic of the right insists that it be inalienable?
The waiver argument does, however, highlight one important feature of majority rule
popular sovereignty, this right would have bite only in a world where a majority of the
polity was indeed persuaded that the right was in our Constitution, akin to the unused
tracks of Article V.
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When Jefferson penned his Declaration of Independence, simple
majority rule popular sovereignty had not yet achieved full legal protec-
tion in America, so the colonists perforce had to rely only on a "natural"
or "revolutionary" right of resistance. But in the ensuing years, they legal-
ized and codified majority rule popular sovereignty, and gave it institu-
tional form with the perfecting of the convention device. The state
declarations did not describe this right as merely "revolutionary" or "nat-
ural"; rather they cloaked it with full legal protection, just as they ac-
corded, say, "speech" and "conscience" legal protection in many cases.
Popular sovereignty majority rule is every bit as much a part of our
Constitution, in word and deed, as Article V. Yet the legal objection does
capture one key difference: the popular sovereignty amendment path is
legally higher than Article V. Article V is not inalienable; popular sover-
eignty is. Article V could be amended away, but popular sovereignty can-
not. Article V only supplements, but can never supplant, majority rule
popular sovereignty.
Of course, in implementing either Amendment path, faithful consti-
tutional interpreters will confront a host of difficult questions. How
would a proposing convention under Article V operate? How should a
ratifying convention or referendum outside Article V best be structured?
I leave these implementation issues for another day. For now, it suf-
fices to say that these issues arise both within Article V and outside it; that
in both cases, ordinary government officials must participate in good
faith in implementing the Amendment process, even if they oppose an
Amendment's substance; and that past implementation practice, espe-
cially at the state level, provides a rich collection of precedents on many
otherwise difficult questions.
But before we can even begin to ask these questions about imple-
menting the non-Article V path, we must accept its existence-within our
Constitution, parallel to Article V, never lower than it, and if anything
even higher than it.
C. The New Constitution Objection
"Even if We the People do have a right to re-Constitute our regime
by majority rule popular sovereignty outside Article V, this right is not a
right to amend our existing Constitution but a right to promulgate an
entirely new and different Constitution. Popular sovereignty outside Arti-
cle V thus means the death of our Constitution, not an amendment of it."
The distinction here is largely nominal. An "amendment," after all,
can often radically re-write the text being amended. Consider, for exam-
ple, an "amendment" to a pending bill that is in fact a substitute bill, from
start to finish-or a purported 28th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
that begins: "Sec. 1. The foregoing is hereby repealed. Sec. 2. We the
People . . . ." Alternatively, a "new Constitution" could read word for
word like the old in every way but with a few new items.
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The real distinction-or at least the one I am focusing on here-is
between a new substantive rule (whether labelled an "amendment" or a
"new Constitution") that becomes supreme law by a legal process pro-
vided for by our existing Constitution, and one that does not-that boot-
straps itself into existence by its own self-defined rule of recognition. And
my claim is that popular sovereignty majority rule falls on the same side
of this line as Article V amendment; both are provided for by our existing
Constitution, and neither is akin to a coup d'etat. (A coup can be peace-
ful and even popular, but its "legality" is only an ex post artifact of its
success and not an emblem of its ex ante conformity with the rules for
lawful change laid down under the prior regime.)
The distinction between procedures for constitutional change au-
thorized by our existing Constitution (Article V and majority rule popular
sovereignty) and procedures prohibited by it (a "coup," however peaceful
and popular) is vital. Citizens, lawmakers, and judges who have taken
oaths to support our Constitution may-and in some cases must-coop-
erate in implementing the legal procedures under Article V and majority
rule popular sovereignty. Even if oath-takers ratify a "new Constitution,"
they are not in the process violating or betraying the old one, but acting
in pursuance of its deepest norms, practicing what it preaches, flattering
and honoring its framers by legally imitating them.
D. The Deliberation Objection
"Does the First Theorem mean that the majority can do anything it
wants? Instantaneously? Surely majority rule must at least be deliberate
rather than whimsical. And so multiple vote and minority veto rules
should be permitted, so long as they truly do induce deliberation."
It does not necessarily follow from the First Theorem that the major-
ity can simply do whatever it likes. Majority rule does not necessarily im-
ply majority will or majority whim. James Wilson, for example, clearly
stated that the People stood under God and natural law; and that a major-
ity was not entitled to do simply whatever it pleased:
[A]s the law of nature, in other words, as the will of nature's
God, it is indispensably binding upon the people, in whom the
sovereign power resides; and who are, consequently, under the
most sacred obligations to exercise that power, or to delegate it
to such as will exercise it, in a manner agreeable to those rules
and maxims, which the law of nature prescribes to every state,
for the happiness of each, and for the happiness of all. How
vast-how important-how interesting are these truths! They
announce to a free people how exalted their rights; but, at the
same time, they announce to a free people how solemn their
duties are. If a practical knowlege [sic] and ajust sense of these
rights and these duties were diffused among the citizens, and
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properly impressed upon their hearts and minds; how great,
how beneficial, how lasting would be their fruits!165
There is no paradox or contradiction here. Wilson is simply re-
minding us thatjust as Parliament as sovereign was both supreme legisla-
ture and supreme judiciary in England, so in America were the people.
As judges they were indeed bound by the higher law of God; but legally,
they were the earthly judges of that law, the True and Ultimate Supreme
Court. Sitting in their judicial capacity, they had duties as well as rights,
and could not simply do whatever they pleased if doing so would indeed
trench on inviolable rights. And in exercising their judicial judgment, as
in exercising their legislative will, the People act by simple majorities-as
do inferior legislatures and courts, as a general rule. (The Supreme
Court under Article III acts by majority rule among the Justices; but that
does not mean that, in theory, the Justices may simply do whatever they
please.)
Wilson's model makes even more sense when we remember that con-
stitutional amendments were not always understood as creating new rules
by legislative fiat. On the contrary, we have seen that amendments were
often understood as judicial declarations of existing rights that individu-
als and entities had under custom or natural reason or both.
In order to deliberate properly-legislatively as well as judicially-
the People must indeed be exposed to and must engage opposing ideas;
the majority should attempt to reason with and persuade dissenters, and
vice versa. Majority rule popular sovereignty presupposes a deliberate
majority of the collective "people," not a mere mathematical concatena-
tion of atomized "persons." In the words of Publius' opening sentence:
"[Y]ou are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United
States of America."' 66
Because the requisite convocations and deliberations could not oc-
cur en masse in 1787 among all voters, the Founders relied on smaller
conventions to speak as and for the People. Direct special election for a
single purpose would minimize the "agency gap" between convention
and electors, but the convention could carry on extended deliberations
and discussions that would be difficult in the polity at large. In 1787, a
referendum would have been a ess true index of the will and judgment of
a deliberate majority, given that many voters in the referendum would
not have had the benefit of focused discussion from the most articulate
proponents of varying views.
Today, because of vast improvements in communication and trans-
portation technology--radio, television, cable, fiber-optics, electronic
town meetings, etc.-there may be ways to retain the deliberation of the
convention while providing for even more direct popular participation,
165. 1 The Works ofJames Wilson, supra note 9, at 153.
166. The Federalist No. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added).
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akin to referenda. (Perhaps, for example, citizens :could assemble in
caucuses in their towns and neighborhoods, and these assemblies could
be electronically and interactively linked to focused debate in a central
convention assembly. After hearing these debates themselves and having
the opportunity to speak up in their local caucus, the citizens could then
vote directly on the proposed amendment, rather than in effect surren-
dering their proxies to convention members.)
There thus remains considerable room for flexibility in implement-
ing the deliberation requirement, including, perhaps, a requirement for
two separate votes, spaced far enough apart to allow true conversation
and conversion to occur, and for second thoughts to cool fleeting fancy.
But there can be no similar compromise on the principle of simple ma-
jority rule. As the framing generation well understood, and modem
political science has reaffirmed, simple majority rule has unique mathe-
matical properties. It is the only workable voting rule that treats all voters
and all policy proposals equally.'67 Once majority rule is abandoned,
there is no logical stopping point between, say, a 50% plus two rule, and a
99.9% rule. And the latter, of course, surely is not rule by the people.
Thus, in the pregnant phrase "deliberate majority," there is no
unique mechanism for ensuring deliberation, but majority rule does have
a unique instantiation. The people must talk, listen, and vote, and that
takes time. (By its very nature, the people's right to alter or abolish "at
any time" cannot be instantaneous.) But when they do vote, a majority,
however small, must in the end prevail over a minority.
E. The Individual Rights Objection
"But what about individual rights?"
In the end, individual rights in our system are, and should be, the
products of ultimately majoritarian processes. Once again, there is noth-
ing paradoxical about this. Sloppy philosophical rhetoric notwithstand-
ing, there is nothing in the ontological character of a "right" that requires
that it be vested in an "individual" or "minority" against the "majority." It
is perfectly intelligible to speak of majority rights. And historically, many
of the most important rights in the federal Bill of Rights and its state
counterparts have been majoritarian rights of the people. 168 Through
majoritarian processes, We the People have also recognized rights of indi-
167. See Kenneth 0. May, A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
for Simple Majority Decision, 20 Econometrica 680, 683 (1952) (simple majority rule is
only mechanism that does not (1) favor one individual over another, (2) favor one
alternative over another, (3) fail to generate a definite result in some situation, or (4) fail
to respond positively to individual preferences). For discussion of a voting mechanism that
in some situations can satisfy the first three conditions, see Bruce A. Ackerman, Social
Justice in the Liberal State 284-89 (1980) (discussing "responsive lotteries"); Akhil Reed
Amar, Note, Choosing Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 Yale LJ. 1283, 1292-1308
(1984) (discussing "lottery voting" for candidates).
168. See generally Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, supra note 142.
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viduals and minorities, and extended the right to be part of We the Polity
to formerly excluded elements of society like black men and women of all
races.
169
Conventional wisdom emphasizing "countermajoritarian"judicial re-
view to protect unpopular rights is also shortsighted. Presidents select
judges, and Presidents are elected by majorities. In the long run, rights
will only be safe if they are understood and accepted by the polity, and
not just the judges.
Because each citizen sees herself as in the minority on some issues,
each is likely to embrace some general idea of "minority rights" out of
long term self-interest, as well as fairness. Indeed, if any citizen feels that
the Constitution should not be lightly amended-at any time, for any
reason, by simple majority rule-she is free to vote against any substantive
amendment she might otherwise favor on second order procedural/pru-
dential grounds based on the breadth, depth, or distribution of substan-
tive opposition to the amendment. Popular sovereignty does not prevent
us from striking a balance in our own minds that strongly privileges the
constitutional status quo. But popular sovereignty does prevent us from
denying future generations of popular majorities-our posterity-the
right to strike a different balance.
The individual rights objection may also prove too much, for at least
some variants are opposed to any amendment of certain rights. But the
question before the house is not whether amendment can occur, but how.
Why do individual rightists trust Government with the power to amend
but not the People? To be sure, Government must act with supermajori-
ties-but that is precisely because Government officials often have inter-
ests separate from their constituents, in ways that often threaten liberty.
The malapportionment at the heart of Article V ratification-counting
Utah and California equally-creates further grounds for skepticism and
suspicion. It is easy to imagine conditions under which an amendment
might clear Article V's hurdles even if opposed by a majority of the
American electorate.
A further turn of the screw: Article V, if exclusive, seems to say any-
thing goes; no right is immune from abandonment-except Senate
equality and (prior to 1808) the slave trade. So much follows from the
logic of expressio unius and a blindered examination of Article V in isola-
tion. But these are the very flawed interpretive premises the "First Theo-
rem" challenges. Once we see the Constitution through, say, James
Wilson's eyes, we see that perhaps not everything is properly amendable.
Certain higher law principles-including popular sovereignty majority
rule, but encompassing other inalienable rights as well-frame Article V
itself. If we look at state declarations, we see, for example, that the indi-
vidual "right of conscience" may, like popular sovereignty itself, be
"unalienable." Ordinary Government should arguably not be allowed to
169. See U.S. Const. amends. XIII-XV, XIX.
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amend this away-despite the fact that Article V itself says nothing ex-
plicit about "conscience"-at least in the absence of a solemn (judicial)
declaration of the People themselves, in convention assembled, that they
no longer judge conscience an "inalienable" right.'70
Or to pick a much easier example: the very logic of popular sover-
eignty itself implies that there is an unalienable "Meiklejohn core"171 of
the First Amendment-that minimal amount of free expression constitu-
tive of republican self-government itself, and logically implied by the peo-
ple's right to alter or abolish. (How can the people exercise this right
against Government if they cannot speak against Government?) Ordi-
nary Government should not be allowed to amend away this Meiklejohn
core, even if ordinary Government strictly follows the rules of Article V.
Such an amendment should be treated by judges as unconstitutional-a
kind of coup d'etat, violative of first principles of our constitutional or-
der, despite formal compliance with Article V.
But this kind of thinking-which should warm the hearts of some
individual rightists-is intelligible only if we reject the flawed interpretive
premises that lead to Article V exclusivity.
F. The Geographic Objection
"But doesn't Article V exist to protect geographic minorities?"
No. Analytically, the rules of Article V may be satisfied even if an
amendment is fiercely opposed in one geographic section of the country.
And the analytic point has powerful empirical support. The leading polit-
ical science study of the federal amendments since the Founding, au-
thored by Alan Grimes, concludes that a dominant "characteristic of
amendment politics has been the sectional or regional aspect of the polit-
ical struggle." 172 The very titles of Grimes's chapters are devastating to
the geographic objection. Amendments One through Twelve are la-
belled "The Southern Amendments," Thirteen through Fifteen "The
Northern Amendments," Sixteen through Nineteen "The Western
Amendments" and Twenty-three through Twenty-six "The Urban
Amendments." 173
Indeed, the framers explicitly rejected the premise underlying the
geographic objection. In response to concerns at Philadelphia that one
day, the population of Western states would overwhelm the East, James
Wilson proclaimed:
170. The argument in this paragraph tracks Jeff Rosen's fascinating Note, Was the
Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 Yale LJ. 1073 (1991). Though I am not
sure I ultimately agree with Rosen's argument, it is plausible and important.
171. I invoke here the brilliant work of Alexander Meiklejohn. See generally
Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People
(1960); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev.
245.
172. Alan P. Grimes, Democracy and the Amendments to the Constitution 26 (1978).
173. Id. at vii.
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Conceiving that all men wherever placed have equal rights and
are equally entitled to confidence, [I view] without apprehension
the period when a few States should contain the superior
number of people. The majority of people wherever found
ought in all questions to govern the minority. If the interior
Country should acquire this majority they will not only have the
right, but will avail themselves of it whether we will or no.174
That a majority within a polity should rule, regardless of geographic
distribution, is confirmed not just by the leading Founder's words but-
here too-by the act of constitution itself. Georgia's Article V ana-
logue1 75 required a majority within each Georgia county and yet the ana-
logue, like those of its sister states, was supplemented by Article VII's
simple majority vote of the state convention as a whole regardless of
geography.
G. The Federalism Objection
"But are states within the union truly akin to counties within states?
Perhaps the First Theorem is indeed true as a matter of state constitu-
tional law; but doesn't the federal-or at least, mixed-nature of our con-
tinental union render state Article V analogues ultimately not analogous?"
Here, at last, we come to the hardest objection to my "First Theo-
rem." We have reached a fork in the road, and must choose one of three
paths. And that choice will make all the difference.
Path #1 was Jefferson Davis's: The people of each state remained
sovereign even after union, and as such, retained the inalienable right-
notwithstanding Article V-to alter or abolish their Government, and
even withdraw from the Union, by simple majority rule popular sover-
eignty state by state.
Path #2 was James Wilson's: After ratification under Article VII, We
the People became-if we were not already before-a truly continental
people. So far as the continental Constitution was concerned, majority
rule popular sovereignty outside Article V meant a national majority.
State peoples continued to exist, and in effect enjoy sovereign powers
over their own state legislatures and state constitutions. And thus, for
state constitutional purposes state peoples continue to retain the right to
alter or abolish outside their state Article V analogue. But the state peo-
ple is clearly subordinate to the national people,just as state constitutions
are subordinate to the national Constitution. The people of a single state
may not nullify the federal Government's action, but the national people
may. Unilateral secession by the part is void, but the whole people can
peacefully agree to divide, just as they can agree to merge with other
peoples-for example, by admitting Texas.
174. 1 Farrand, supra note 28, at 605.
175. See Ga. Const. of 1777, art. LXIIL
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Path #3 was James Madison's: Ordinary government under the Con-
stitution was neither wholly "national," nor purely "federal"-"federal"
here meaning league-like, as in the "Articles of Confederation." As with
ordinary government, so too with constitutional amendment. Neither
the people of each state nor the people of the nation were wholly sover-
eign. Sovereignty had somehow been divided, with Article V embodying
the precise-exclusive-terms of the division.
Which path is most plausible? Not, I think, Jefferson Davis's. For the
text of the Constitution makes clear in Article VI that any state constitu-
tional provision-even if adopted by majority rule popular sovereignty in
a state-is inferior to the federal Constitution. And Article V makes clear
that a state people can be bound by a federal amendment even if that
state people in state convention explicitly rejects the amendment. (Here,
Article V differs dramatically from Article VII.) Both of these provisions
are logically inconsistent with the sovereignty of the people of each state.
And if we examine the constitution of 1787 as an act, and not a mere text,
we will find no one-on either side of ratification-asserting that after
ratification a state people could unilaterally secede at will.176
That leaves us with a choice between the Constitution's two greatest
architects, James Madison andJames Wilson. And on the vital question of
popular sovereignty, Wilson-though less celebrated and studied today-
was the truer prophet, seeing further and more clearly.
Wilson built his argument axiomatically on the idea that sovereignty
was absolute and indivisible. 177 This view was almost universally held in
the 1780s. Divided sovereignty was seen as a logical contradiction, a "sole-
cism." 178 Indeed, so far as I can tell, Madison was the only major figure
who believed in it.
Why did virtually no one follow Madison's lead on this point? Per-
haps because they understood-as did Wilson and Davis, for example-
that "divided" or "mixed" popular sovereignty was no popular sover-
eignty. A fundamental principle for republican government was that the
majority should rule,179 and divided sovereignty betrayed that fundamen-
tal principle. The formal principle of popular sovereignty, in other
words, cannot tell us whether we should be a state people, or a national
people, but it does insist that we be one or the other. (And since Davis
was wrong, Wilson must be right.) For if sovereignty can indeed be di-
vided-as only Madison believed-then We the People today cannot con-
trol our fate.
176. For more documentation and elaboration of these claims, see Amar, supra note
37, at 1451-66. And for discussion of the geostrategic logic undergirding all this see Akhil
Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 483, 485-91
(1991).
177. See supra text accompanying note 58.
178. See Wood, supra note 6, at 345; Amar, supra note 3, at 1063 & n.71.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 85-113.
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A concluding example should make this clear. Women today consti-
tute a majority of both the Massachusetts and American polities. They
are today governed under a federal Constitution largely the making of
men who died long ago, men who may not have had their interests fore-
most in mind. If either the Massachusetts or American People is sover-
eign, women-in combination with like-minded men-could by simple
majority vote alter or abolish patriarchal rules in the federal Constitution,
following Davis or Wilson. But if sovereignty can indeed be divided, and
Article V enshrined as exclusive, the women of Massachusetts-and of
each of the other states-have lost their right of majority rule self-govern-
ment. They must rely on ordinary Government officials-overwhelm-
ingly men-to act by supermajorities in order to, say, enshrine the Equal
Rights Amendment. 8 0
This is not popular self rule; it is rule from cold graves of dead men
of constitutions past, and by small clumps of old men in ordinary Govern-
ment. For me at least, one of the best reasons for embracing the "First
Theorem" is the self-evident truth that women, too, are created equal.
180. Nor is the fact that women can "vote the rascals out" a sufficient answer. As we
have seen, supra note 8, the structure of elections for individual legislators places the
electorate in each district in a prisoners' dilemma, where a vote against the incumbent will
cause the district as a whole to lose predicted benefits vis-fi-vis other districts. This example
illustrates once again how a one-shot convention differs in important structural ways from
an on-going legislature, with the electorate having much less control over the latter.
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